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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, "an endless stream of exotic financial
instruments conjured by Wall Street wizards" literally has taken
the financial community by storm, fundamentally altering market
trading practices and pitting institutions against each other in an
intense competition for development of still more innovative in-
struments.1 These products-which include various types of
"swaps," options, forward contracts, and price guarantees-now
are being offered to and traded by every major financial institution
and multinational corporation in the world, as well as by govern-
ments and individuals, and nothing indicates that the unprece-
dented growth of the markets for such instruments is likely to sub-
side any time soon. To the contrary, the trend clearly is toward
increased "product proliferation" and the addition of still more ar-
cane and complex trading vehicles to the already dizzying array
now available.
The speed with which these products have reached the mar-
kets plainly has outstripped the ability of accountants, lawyers,
and regulators to keep pace with their development and to deter-
mine their status under prevailing law and practices. In particular,
although these products to some extent parallel existing instru-
ments within the traditional regulatory jurisdiction of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), their new and varied features have
created substantial uncertainty as to the proper locus of regulatory
jurisdiction over their trading. Whether the SEC, CFTC, or other
agencies have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction with respect to
these new instruments, or whether they even have jurisdiction at
all, often is unclear.
This Article first will discuss the general scope of the commod-
ities and securities industries and the respective regulatory spheres
of the CFTC and SEC. This background is essential to any under-
standing of the nature and regulatory status of new financial in-
struments, many of which are derived from more traditional types
of investment and trading vehicles within the jurisdiction of these
agencies, and all of which have been structured to minimize the
likelihood of being encompassed within such jurisdiction. Indeed,
it is virtually impossible to appreciate the potential regulatory
problems associated with the offer and sale of such instruments
1. New Distortions in Financial Statements, DUN'S Bus. MONTH, June 1986, at 46.
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without at least some detailed knowledge of the regulatory envi-
ronments from which they developed.
Following this discussion, the Article will focus on the nature
of certain new financial instruments and will analyze the applica-
bility of SEC and CFTC jurisdiction to those instruments.2 Finally,
the Article will make recommendations regarding the future course
of this regulatory structure.
II. THE COMMODITY FUTURES INDUSTRY
The commodity futures industry comprises a variety of differ-
ent types of instruments and a number of categories of individuals
and entities engaged in a broad range of trading activities. The
industry principally involves the trading of futures and option con-
tracts on regulated exchanges, known as "contract markets," sub-
ject to the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the CFTC under the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).3 As discussed below, it also
includes a number of off-exchange products.
Exchange traded futures and option contracts are entered into
through registered brokerage firms, known as "futures commission
merchants" or "FCMs," subject to extensive and intensive CFTC
regulation.' In particular, FCMs must maintain a specified level of
2. This Article does not address a wide variety of financial instruments. Several of
them have spawned publications that are confined solely to those instruments. Space limita-
tions, however, dictate that only certain of these types of instruments may be addressed in
this Article. In addition, this Article will not address the status of the products at issue
under federal banking law or state law, including insurance laws, each of which similarly
warrant separate treatment.
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982). The CEA establishes an extensive set of registration
requirements, as well as substantive prohibitions and reporting obligations, which are im-
posed upon brokers and traders. The CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction is established in 7 U.S.C.
§ 2a (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The CFTC was created in 1974, by amendments to the CEA,
which also extended the coverage of the CEA to all previously unregulated commodities. See
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 § 102, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat.
1389 (1974). The original CEA had been enacted in 1936. Commodities Exchange Act, Ch.
545, 49 Stat. 149(1) (1936). For a discussion of the commodity futures markets and the
nature and purposes of commodity trading, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); CFTC REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 21
OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (1980). See also Markham & Gilberg, Federal Regulation
of Bank Activities in the Commodities Markets, 39 Bus. LAW. 1719 (1984).
4. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The primary function of an FCM is to solicit
customer orders and accounts and to accept customer funds for trading on behalf of custom-
ers on designated contract markets. FCMs may conduct their operations through a sales
force of employees, who must be registered with the CFTC as associated persons and are the
equivalent of registered representatives of a securities broker-dealer. 17 C.F.R. § 3.12 (1986).
In the alternative, an FCM may operate through an independent sales force made up of
introducing brokers, who are registered separately under the CEA. See Horwitz & Gilberg,
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minimum net capital at all times, segregate customers' funds and
securities, and prepare and retain detailed books and records of
their operations.5 FCMs that also are members of contract markets
are subject to additional regulatory requirements imposed by the
exchanges. FCMs that are not members of any contract market
must execute transactions on behalf of customers by clearing them
through a member firm.
The CFTC also regulates the activities of commodity trading
advisors, commodity pool operators, and floor brokers, among
other individuals and entities.7 Moreover, the CFTC exercises ex-
clusive jurisdiction with respect to exchange traded futures con-
tracts and certain option contracts.8 As a result, the states are stat-
utorily prohibited from substantively regulating the activities of
firms and individuals in these areas. State common law and anti-
Introducing Brokers Under The Commodity Exchange Act: A New Category of Commodity
Professionals, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 907 (1983). The term "contract market" is a statu-
tory term of art referring only to United States commodities exchanges regulated by the
CFTC. See Horwitz & Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission:
Scene II, 39 Bus. LAW. 67 (1983); Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission:
Newest Member of Each Exchange's Management Team, 34 FED. B. J. 173 (1975); Mark-
ham & Schobel, Commodity Exchange Act Rule Approval-Procedural Mishmash or Anti-
trust Umbrella?, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 746 (Special Supp.) (Jan. 13,
1976). Contract markets operate as self-regulatory exchanges, with their own rules and disci-
plinary procedures, subject to supervision and control by the CFTC.
5. FCMs generally must maintain a minimum net capital of $50,000 at all times. 7
U.S.C. § 6d (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1986). A firm's net capital is defined
according to a complex formula, similar to that applicable to registered broker-dealers under
the securities laws. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 3, at 1750-52. The record keeping
requirements are set forth in CFTC regulations. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31-.40 (1986). With respect
to FCM segregation requirements, see Markham & Gilberg, supra note 3, at 1752-53.
6. See generally Markham & Schobel, Self-Regulation Under The Commodity
Exchange Act-Can The CFTC Make It Work?, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 368 (Spe-
cial Supp.) (September 1, 1976).
7. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2a, 6m (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The definition of a commodity trading
advisor generally encompasses any person rendering advice about the value of, or the advis-
ability of trading in, any CFTC-regulated instruments, thereby encompassing persons man-
aging accounts on a discretionary basis as well as those dispensing "passive" forms of advice.
Prior to amendments to the CEA in 1982, however, the term was defined much more
broadly. It included any person rendering advice about the value of commodities-not
merely futures, options or other CFTC-regulated instruments. See Horwitz & Markham,
supra note 4, at 86-87. The term "commodity pool operator" encompasses any person man-
aging a pooled vehicle for the trading of CFTC-regulated instruments, subject to a number
of exemptions. 17 C.F.R. § 4.13 (1985). Commodity trading advisors and commodity pool
operators themselves are subject to a separate, although less extensive, regulatory scheme.
See Mitchell, The Regulation of Commodity Trading Advisors, 27 EMoRy L.J. 957 (1978);
Rosen, Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under The Commodity Exchange Act, 40
WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 937 (1983).
8. See infra notes 10-36.
1602
NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
fraud statutes, however, remain applicable, and with respect to off-
exchange instruments, the states retain concurrent jurisdiction
with the CFTC."
A. Futures Contracts
In general, a futures contract is a contractual obligation be-
tween two parties to make and receive delivery, respectively, of a
stated quantity of a commodity at a fixed price in a future delivery
month. 10 Futures contracts are traded on the basis of "margin" de-
posits, which essentially are good faith performance bonds in-
tended to assure the performances of the parties to the contracts.I'
Both the purchaser and seller of the underlying commodity must
make deposits upon entering into the contract, known as "original"
or "initial" margin, and may be required to make additional pay-
ments, known as "maintenance" or "variation" margin, as the mar-
ket moves adversely to their positions.' 2 Conversely, the holder of a
futures contract may be entitled to receive payments of variation
margin in the event that the market moves in a favorable
direction.
Although all futures contracts create binding obligations on
the parties to make and receive delivery, respectively, of an under-
lying commodity or a cash settlement, a trader may "offset" or
"liquidate" a position, without actually making or accepting deliv-
ery, by entering into an equal and opposite obligation.1 3 After a
final settlement of variation margin, the trader then either receives
or pays the difference in the value of the contract. Of course, in a
small number of instances, the parties to a futures contract actu-
ally make and receive delivery of the underlying commodity, al-
though some contracts result in a cash settlement rather than
physical delivery. In an overwhelming number of cases, however,
positions are closed out by offset prior to the time specified for
delivery. This high incidence of settlement by liquidation occurs
because futures contracts are traded primarily for the purpose of
9. See infra notes 308-10 and accompanying text. See also Gilberg, Precious Metals
Trading-The Last Frontier of Unregulated Investment, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 985-
91 (1984); Horwitz & Markham, supra note 4, at 76-80.
10. See CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL (1982); 1 P. JOHNSON,
COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.05 (1982).
11. P. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at §§ 1.05, 1.10; T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMOD-
ITY FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS §§ 2.03-2.04 (1983).
12. P. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at § 1.10.
13. Id.
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hedging price risks or speculating against price fluctuations, rather
than for purchasing or selling physical commodities. 14 As a result,
traders ordinarily are interested only in obtaining cash payments
of price differentials, not actual commodities.
For example, a farmer anticipating the production of a soy-
bean crop in a future month may wish to assure that the price he
receives at that time is not less than the market price projected for
the time of delivery. In order to do so, the farmer may enter into a
futures contract to sell a stated quantity of soybeans at a fixed
price in a particular delivery month, known as a "short" position.
If prices decline between the time of contract and the time of deli-
very, the farmer will have protected himself by "locking in" the
higher price. If prices rise, the farmer will have foregone a portion
of the higher price received for his crop because of the cost of en-
tering into and liquidating the futures position, but will still profit
and will have been protected from price drops. Conversely, a soy-
bean user who is concerned about a price rise before the time he
acquires the commodity may enter into a futures contract to buy
soybeans, a "long" position. If the price increase does occur, the
user will have "locked in" the lower price.
With the development of financial 'futures contracts in the
1970s, including contracts on debt obligations, foreign currencies,
indexes, and other products, these types of hedging opportunities
became available to institutions and other participants in the
financial markets as well.15 For example, a portfolio manager with
a debt instrument portfolio may wish to hedge against a rise in
interest rates, which would cause a decline in the portfolio's value.
This hedging can be accomplished by entering into a contract to
sell Treasury bonds at a fixed price in a stated delivery month. If
interest rates do rise, the portfolio manager may be able to offset
the decline in value of portfolio securities in whole or in part by
profits earned on the Treasury bond futures. The same opportu-
nity is available to institutional investors with broad-based equity
14. Id.
15. Yeutter, Futures Trading in the 1980's, Special Report, The Futures Markets and
National Policy: An Agenda for the 1980s, Nat'l J., Sept. 24, 1983, at 64-66. See also Comp-
troller of the Currency, Trust Banking Circular No. 79 (April 19, 1983); Comptroller of the
Currency, Trust Banking Circular No. 14 (October 16, 1981); Fitzgerald, Innovations in Fi-
nancial Futures, BANKER, April 1983, at 95; Horwitz & Markham, supra note 4, at 67-69;
Markham & Gilberg, Washington Watch, 6 CORP. L. REV. 59, 61 (1983); Weiner, The Hedg-
ing Rationale For A Stock Index Futures Contract, 1 J. FUT. MKT. 59 (1981); Vernon, Stock
Index Futures: Is There Life After Death For The Securities Markets? 35 Bus. LAw. 823
(1980).
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security portfolios through the purchase and sale of futures con-
tracts on stock indexes. In addition, as in the case of agricultural
futures, a "long" position in financial futures contracts can protect
against a rise in the price of the securities or currencies to be
acquired.
The CEA prohibits the offer and sale of any futures contract
other than on a designated contract market. The Act also provides
the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction to enforce this prohibition.'6
Moreover, with the development of financial futures, Congress
amended the CEA definition of a "commodity" to include financial
instruments and all other goods and services on which futures con-
tracts may be offered, and thus brought these products within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC as well. These amendments, as
discussed more fully below, have triggered an ongoing jurisdic-
tional battle between the CFTC and the SEC.1 Nevertheless,
despite the generally accepted description of a "futures contract"
set forth above, neither the CEA nor the CFTC regulations contain
a precise definition. As a result, the construction of the term has
been left to CFTC and judicial interpretation.
The CEA does state, however, that the prohibition on off-
exchange futures trading does not extend to "forward" contracts,
or "deferred delivery" contracts on commodities: "[T]he term 'con-
tract for future delivery'. . . shall not include any sale of any cash
commodity for deferred shipment or delivery."' 8 This exclusion
was inserted into the original CEA in 1936, in order to assure that
commercial transactions involving future delivery of actual com-
modities would not be within the scope of the statute.'" Although
the statute does not precisely articulate the distinction between
forward contracts and futures contracts, Congress clearly intended
to exclude standard agreements between commercial entities
involving delivery of physical commodities at a later date from the
prohibition on off-exchange futures trading.20
16. 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
17. See Johnson, The Perimeters of Regulatory Jurisdiction Under The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 61 (1975); Note, The Role of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974, 73 MICH. L. REv. 710 (1975).
18. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); Committee on Commodities Regulation of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, The Forward Contract Exclusion: An Analysis of Off-
Exchange Commodity-Based Investments, 41 Bus. LAW. 853, 856-63 (1986) [hereinafter City
Bar Report].
19. City Bar Report, supra note 18, at 859.
20. Id.
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In delineating the relative characteristics of futures and for-
ward contracts, the CFTC and the courts have focused principally
on the commercial character of the latter and on whether delivery
of physical commodities ordinarily occurs. In particular, the
CFTC's Office of General Counsel (OGC) stated in an early inter-
nal memorandum that
(1) Congress intended generally to prohibit any public marketing of contracts
for the future delivery of commodities-in the plain and literal meaning of
that phrase-except through the facilities of a designated contract market,
and (2) this complete prohibition was intended to be subject to an exception
solely for the benefit of persons involved in a commercial cash commodity
business, which would allow them to effect cash sales of the commodity, con-
templating actual delivery as a matter of course, but in which delivery of the
commodity might be deferred for the purposes of commercial convenience or
necessity.21
The CFTC subsequently amplified this conclusion in In Re
Stovall,22 which for many years represented the CFTC's clearest
and most complete articulation of its definition of a futures con-
tract. In essence, the CFTC stated that the CEA's deferred deliv-
ery exemption "was intended to cover only contracts for sale which
are entered into with the expectation that delivery of the actual
commodity will eventually occur through performance on the con-
tracts. '23 In addition, the CFTC identified four "classic" elements
of futures contracts, which, although not strictly required in every
case, evidence the existence of such an instrument: (1) the stand-
ardization of contract terms; (2) instruments "directly or indirectly
offered to the general public"; (3) transactions that are "generally
secured by earnest money or 'margin "; and (4) transactions "that
are entered into primarily for the purpose of assuming or shifting
the risk of changes in the values of commodities rather than for
transferring ownership of the actual commodities. ' 24 A number of
post-Stovall decisions, rendered by the CFTC as well as the courts,
have reiterated and elaborated upon this definition.25
21. Memorandum of CFTC Office of the General Counsel, reprinted in [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,772 (Exhibit 1) (1978).
22. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941 (1979).
23. Id. at 23,777.
24. Id.
25. CFTC v. Co Petro Marking Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982); CFTC v.
National Coal Exch., Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 21,424
(W.D. Tenn. 1982); In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,707 (CFTC 1983); Jackson v. American Gold Dealers Ass'n, [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 21,956 (CFTC 1983); CFTC v. Commer-
cial Petrolera Internacional, S.A., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
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Recently, the OGC has issued a number of interpretive
releases that, while reaffirming the Stovall criteria, have placed
greater reliance on whether delivery is required and ordinarily
occurs as a matter of course under a particular type of contract. In
one instance, the OGC stated that futures contracts evidence one
or a combination of the following characteristics: they involve the
purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery for a price
determined at the time of contract; they contain standardized
terms; they are entered into not for the purpose of transferring
ownership but for hedging or speculation; and they are settled or-
dinarily by offset or liquidation.2" These elements, of course, re-
present the traditional criteria relied upon by the courts and the
CFTC.
The OGC also implied, however, that these factors have been
relegated to secondary importance and that the principal determi-
nation on the question of whether a futures contract is present will
be made on the basis of delivery.27 For example, if delivery is
intended and regularly occurs under a certain type of arrangement,
the CFTC is less likely to find that the instrument is a futures
contract, even if the contracts are standardized, margined, and so
forth. Conversely, the absence of these features no longer may pre-
T 21,222 (CFTC 1981). In Stovall, however, the CFTC noted that the elements set forth
were not "an exhaustive catalogue of factors in determining whether an instrument is a
futures contract." In re Stoval at 23,778-79. To the contrary, the CFTC and the courts
repeatedly have held that, like the court's approach in determining the existence of a "se-
curity," the identification of a futures contract depends upon a review of all the circum-
stances of a particular case. In In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., the CFTC found that
"forward" contracts offered by two precious metals dealers were "of standardized form, pro-
viding for delivery of a given quantity of precious metals at a date in the future at a price
fixed at the outset of the transaction." First Nat'l Monetary at 26,771. In addition, custom-
ers could take long or short positions with the dealer acting as principal in every transac-
tion. The initial deposit made by the customer, which represented a percentage of the total
purchase price, was variable at the dealer's discretion and, if the equity in the customer's
account fell below a specific maintenance level, additional funds could be required. Id. Simi-
larly, in Jackson the dealer offered a "cash forward contract" which exhibited similar fea-
tures. Jackson at 28,119.
26. The Regulation of Leverage Transactions and Other Off-Exchange Future-Deliv-
ery Type Investments-Statutory Interpretation, reprinted in [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,518 (March 25, 1985); OGC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2,
[1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673 (August 6, 1985).
27. See OGC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, supra note 26, at 1 22,673. The principal
focus of the discussion in these interpretive releases and letters has been the question of
whether the parties intended delivery, and whether delivery ordinarily occurs as a matter of
course. In fact, in one release cited above, the traditional characteristics of a futures con-
tract were relegated to a footnote. The Regulation of Leverage Transactions and Other Off-
Exchange Future-Delivery Type Investments-Statutory Interpretation, reprinted in [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,518, at 30,261 n.2 (March 25, 1985).
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vent a finding of a futures contract if delivery is unlikely. Although
the CFTC has not abandoned explicitly the "classic" definition of
a futures contract, recent statements indicate a shift away from it,
and therefore the state of the law is at best unclear.
Notably, many financial instruments may be subject to a fur-
ther exclusion from the prohibition on off-exchange futures trad-
ing, regardless of whether they are found to constitute permissible
forward contracts. This so-called "Treasury Amendment,"
included in the CEA by Congress in 1974 at the Treasury Depart-
ment's request, was designed to assure that the CEA and the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the CFTC would not disrupt unduly the op-
erations of large institutions in the financial markets.2" The
amendment provides that
[n]othing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to
transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, securities rights, resales of
installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities or
mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions
involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.2 '
Although the legislative history of the Treasury Amendment is
unclear, it has been argued in several instances that the Amend-
ment was intended to exclude all trading in financial instruments
from the scope of the CEA, unless that trading takes place on a
28. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5843, 5887.
29. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Treasury Amendment was included in
the statute in response to a letter submitted by the Department of the Treasury, to the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. In that letter, the Treasury
argued that, in the absence of a provision excluding transactions in foreign currency from
the scope of the CEA, the statute would have an unintended impact upon the ability of
banks and other financial institutions to trade among themselves in foreign currencies and
certain financial instruments. See Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50
Fed. Reg. 42,983, 42,985 (1985). The letter also stated:
The Department feels strongly that foreign currency futures trading, other than on
organized exchanges, should not be regulated by the [CFTC]. Virtually all futures trad-
ing in foreign currencies in the United States is carried out through an informal net-
work of banks and dealers. This dealer market, which consists primarily of the large
banks, has proved highly efficient in serving the needs of international business in
hedging the risks which stem from foreign exchange rate movements. The participants
in this market are sophisticated and informed institutions, unlike the participants on
organized exchanges, which, in some cases, include individuals and small traders who
may need to be protected by some form of governmental regulation.
Letter from Donald L.E. Ritger, Acting General Council, Dep't of the Treasury, to Herman
E. Talmadge, Chairman, Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry (July 30, 1974), reprinted in S.
REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
5843, 5887.
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regulated exchange.30 Under this line of reasoning, neither the
nature of the instruments nor the types of participants in the
transactions are material considerations; that the product is based
upon one of the commodities identified in the Treasury Amend-
ment is sufficient to remove the instrument from both the off-ex-
change trading prohibition and the CFTC's jurisdiction.
In this regard, the legislative history of the Treasury Amend-
ment states that the statute is "not applicable to trading in foreign
currencies and certain enumerated financial instruments unless
such trading is conducted on a formally organized futures
exchange," suggesting that all off-exchange transactions in such
instruments are exempt.3 1 In addition, the Seventh Circuit ac-
cepted this argument, at least in part, when it decided in 1984 that
contracts for the forward purchase and sale of Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA) certificates are within the
Treasury Amendment and, therefore, outside the CEA's scope un-
less traded on an organized exchange.32
The CFTC, however, relying upon the Treasury Amendment's
legislative history, has stated that the Amendment applies only to
transactions among "sophisticated and informed institutions,"
which do not involve offers to and solicitations of members of the
general public." In addition, the CFTC has taken the position that
a principal premise of the Treasury Amendment is that other regu-
latory authorities govern the activities of institutional investors
and therefore CFTC regulation is unnecessary. The CFTC also has
30. See Public Comments Filed in Response to Statutory Interpretation and Request
for Comments, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983 (1985). In particular, see Letters filed by Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft (December 23, 1985); Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp.
(December 20, 1985); Shearson/Lehman Bros. (December 23, 1985); Rosenman, Colin,
Freund, Lewis & Cohen (December 23, 1985); Merrill Lynch Futures Inc. and Merrill Lynch
International Bank (December 23, 1985). Id.
31. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5843, 5887.
32. Abrams v. Oppenheimer Government Securities, Inc., 737 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1984).
In Oppenheimer the court found that, because GNMA certificates are excluded from the
CEA, contracts for purchase and sale also are not subject to the statute, unless traded on an
organized exchange. The court noted that GNMA forward contracts are not standardized,
but are most often the result of face-to-face negotiations between the parties. Id. at 590. In
addition, the court found that futures and forwards differ with respect to the purpose of the
investment and the expectation of investors. Id. at 591. It is not entirely clear, therefore,
whether the Oppenheimer decision rested primarily upon the ground that the transactions
were bona fide forward contracts, subject to the CEA forward contract exclusion, or that the
Treasury Amendment precluded CFTC jurisdiction over the investments unless traded on
an organized exchange.
33. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983, 42,985 (1985).
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noted that when the transactions involved are not within the
supervision of such authorities, the Amendment is inapplicable. 4
Moreover, the CFTC has concluded that a loosely defined "net-
work" of dealers in financial instruments, although not formally
organized as such, may constitute a "board of trade."3 5 Conse-
quently, in the CFTC's view its jurisdiction may extend to off-ex-
change transactions, notwithstanding the Treasury Amendment.
In one recent instance, discussed more fully below, the CFTC
issued a release stating that forward transactions in foreign cur-
rency traded in the "interbank" market are within the jurisdiction
of the CFTC unless: (1) actual delivery of currency generally is
made and accepted, so that the "forward" contract exclusion is
available; or (2) the transactions occur solely between "sophisti-
cated and informed institutions" and do not involve members of
the general public.36 In the former instance, the CFTC's position is
that the instrument is not a futures contract and therefore not
subject to the CEA. In the latter instance, although the instrument
may be a futures contract, the CFTC stated that the instrument is
outside the CEA's scope because of the Treasury Amendment, but
only under the circumstances described in the Amendment's legis-
lative history.3 7
B. CFTC Regulation of Commodity Options
A commodity option, unlike a futures contract, imposes an
obligation on only one party." In particular, an option contract
provides one party with the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase or sell a stated quantity of a commodity or to enter into a
futures contract for a fixed price at any point before a specified
34. Id.
35. CFTC Office of General Counsel, Interpretive Letter No. 77-12, reprinted in
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,467 (August 17, 1977). In that
instance, the OGC stated that a loosely defined network of dealers in GNMA certificates
could constitute a "board of trade," although not formally organized as such, particularly if
offers and sales were made to members of the general public.
36. Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983 (1985).
The release, however, did not define the meaning of the terms "sophisticated and informed
institutions," but rather solicited public comment on this issue. The release stated only that
products marketed to the general public, which are not encompassed within the forward
contract exemption from the CEA, are outside the scope of the Treasury Amendment and
therefore within the CFTC's jurisdiction.
37. Id. As discussed below, the CFTC since has retreated from that position. See infra
notes 240-49 and accompanying text.
38. See CFTC, GLossAR OF TRADING TERMS 4, 19-20 (1983).
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future date.39 Upon exercise of the option, the purchaser, or
"holder," either must pay the exercise price and receive delivery of
the commodity (a "call" option) or must deliver the commodity
and receive payment (a "put" option). In contrast, the seller, or
"writer," of the option has no ability to determine whether, or at
what point, the option will be exercised, but is obligated to make
or receive delivery once the exercise occurs. In addition, in contrast
to futures contracts trading, which is conducted on the basis of
initial and variation margin payments, 0 an option holder pays a
one-time nonrefundable fee, known as the "premium," for the op-
tion, but is not liable for any additional amounts. The writer, how-
ever, generally is subject to initial and variation margin payments
as a result of the writer's potentially unlimited exposure., 1
The Second Circuit has identified a commodity option based
on three characteristics: (1) the purchaser has the right to make or
take delivery of the underlying commodity; (2) the initial charge
for the option is a nonrefundable premium, which represents the
maximum amount of the purchaser's out-of-pocket loss; and (3)
the purchaser can profit only if the price of the underlying com-
modity moves sufficiently to cover the amount of the premium and
related costs.4 2 Although options may have varying characteristics
39. Id.
40. See supra notes 10-36 and accompanying text.
41. CFTC, supra note 38, at 19-20. For a general discussion of the nature, history and
regulatory status of commodity options see Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options,
1978 DUKE L. J. 1095; Markham & Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Regula-
tory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALBANY L. REV. 741 (1983); Schobel & Markham,
Commodity Options-A New Industry Or Another Debacle?, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 347 (Special Supp. 1976). An option on a futures contract provides the holder with the
right to enter into a long futures position (in the case of a call option) or a short position (in
the case of a put option) at a fixed price. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, OPPORTUNITIES IN
OPTIONS ON U.S. TREASURY BOND FUTURES (1982); COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC., OPTIONS ON
COMEX GOLD FUTURES (1982).
42. United States v. Bein, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 22,004 (2d Cir. 1984). In Bein, the Second Circuit adopted a definition of option contracts
previously enunciated by the Southern District of New York:
Functionally, options are distinguishable from futures contracts and margin sales in at
least three significant respects: (1) The initial charge for an option, sometimes called a
"contango fee," is a non-refundable premium covering the seller's commission and
costs, in contrast to the "down payment" paid in a futures contract or margin sale,
which is applied against the ultimate sale price; (2) the option contract gives the pur-
chaser the right to take physical possession of the commodity, but does not obligate
him to do so, as a futures or margin contract would; (3) a profit in an option contract
accrues only if the price of the commodity rises enough to cover the contango fee (but
the losses are limited to the contango fee), while the futures or margin buyer profits if
the sale of his right to future delivery exceeds the purchase price (and suffers a loss if
the former price is less than the latter price).
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in particular instances, these elements constitute the distinctive
features of such instruments.43
Commodity options also may be traded for hedging or specula-
tive purposes, in a manner similar to futures contracts. For in-
stance, the farmer in the example noted above, instead of taking a
"short" position in futures contracts to protect against a price de-
cline, could purchase a "put" option on the underlying crop. This
put option would grant the farmer the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to sell his crop to the writer for a fixed price at any point
before the option's expiration. If the anticipated price decline oc-
curs, the farmer could exercise the option and sell the crop at the
predetermined price or perhaps liquidate the option at a profit,
which would offset all or a part of the losses incurred in the sale of
the physical commodity. Conversely, a user seeking to protect
against a rise in the price of commodities could purchase a "call"
option, which would provide the user with the right to purchase
the commodities at a set price. Commodity options create specula-
tive opportunities as well because either a purchaser or writer, or
both, may be speculating against price movements in establishing
their respective positions.
Commodity options have been offered in a variety of forms for
many years and have a long history of serious abuses, which have
brought intense congressional and CFTC scrutiny.44 Indeed, after
options speculation had been blamed in large part for the collapse
of the wheat market in the Great Depression, Congress included in
the CEA a blanket prohibition on the trading of any options on
agricultural commodities then under CEA regulation. 45 For more
than thirty years this legislation operated to ban commodity op-
tions trading both on and off exchanges.46
In the early 1970s, however, a new wave of scandals arose,
spearheaded by Harold Goldstein. This twenty-six year old entre-
preneur operated an off-exchange options business pursuant to a
CEA loophole that applied the options ban only to regulated com-
modities. 7 Goldstein offered options on "world" commodities such
Id. at 28,407, quoting CFTC v. The United States Metals Depository, 468 F. Supp. 1149,
1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
43. Bein at p. 28,407. See also Characteristics Distinguishing Cash and Forward Con-
tracts and "Trade" Options, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,656 (1985).
44. See generally Markham & Gilberg, supra note 41.
45. Id. at 759-60.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 760-61.
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as silver, platinum, and coffee, which at that time were unregu-
lated. In fact, however, Goldstein sold "naked" options, because he
did not own the commodities on which the options were written.
As a result, he could satisfy customer exercises only from his own
funds or those of other investors. When the prices of the commodi-
ties allegedly underlying the options began to rise substantially,
Goldstein was unable to satisfy customer demands and went out of
business, leaving millions of dollars of customer losses in his
wake.,8
Following this and similar incidents, Congress amended the
CEA in 1974 to include previously unregulated commodities. 49
Congress, however, did not ban options trading on these commodi-
ties; instead, it granted the CFTC authority to regulate such trad-
ing. 0 Between 1974 and 1978 the CFTC, pursuant to this congres-
sional mandate, adopted regulations that prohibited fraud in
connection with options transactions and required FCM registra-
tion by brokers offering commodity options.5 1 In addition, the
CFTC imposed on such brokers the same net capital and segrega-
tion requirements applicable to other FCMs, and it also estab-
lished specific disclosure obligations.2
Nevertheless, the options industry continued to be plagued by
abuse. In 1978 Congress imposed a moratorium on options trading,
but permitted the CFTC to develop a program for exchange traded
options.53 In 1981 the CFTC announced a three year "pilot pro-
gram" for the trading of options on futures contracts through des-
ignated contract markets.5 4 This pilot program later was expanded
to include options on agricultural and other physical commodi-
ties.5 In 1984 the CFTC increased the number of option contracts
a particular contract market may offer, and it ended the pilot pro-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 762-63.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 764-65. See also 17 C.F.R. §§ 32.1-.12 (1986).
52. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 41, at 765-66.
53. Id. at 766-768.
54. Regulation of Domestic Exchange-Traded Commodity Options, 46 Fed. Reg.
54,500 (1981). The pilot program had been proposed originally in 1977 but was not adopted
until 1981. General Regulations Under the CEA, 42 Fed. Reg. 55,538, 55,550 (1977); Lower,
supra note 41, at 1095.
55. Expansion of Pilot Program to include Options on Physicals, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,996
(1982). The inclusion of options on physical commodities in the pilot program was proposed
on June 30, 1982, see Expansion of Pilot Program Provisions, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,401 (1982),
after a court challenge by the American Stock Exchange. See, American Stock Exch., Inc. v.
CFTC, 528 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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gram and made the status of exchange traded commodity options
permanent in 1986.56 Even during the term of the options ban, and
to this date, the CEA has permitted off-exchange commodity
option trading under certain limited circumstances. First, many
physical commodities producers have sold options backed by phys-
ical inventory, thereby limiting their risk.5 7 In particular, metals
processors for many years have written options against metals that
they have held in connection with their businesses. The CEA and
CFTC regulations, subject to a number of conditions, expressly
permit these so-called "dealer" options.5 8 These conditions include
a requirement that the writer have been in the business of both
utilizing the underlying commodity and writing options on the
underlying commodity by May 1, 1978; that the writer have a net
worth of five million dollars; that the writer issue confirmations
and other documents to purchasers; and that the writer comply
with a number of segregation, recordkeeping, and disclosure
requirements. 59
CFTC regulations also include an exemption from the options
ban for so-called "trade" options, which are options sold to a per-
son who is a producer, processor, or commercial user of the under-
lying commodity and who purchases the option in connection with
his business.60 A trade option writer's status is irrelevant, although
the writer must have a "reasonable basis" to believe that the pur-
chaser is a permissible offeree 1
In a no-action letter, the CFTC's Division of Trading and
Markets has stated that such a reasonable basis must be grounded
in something more than the purchaser's unsubstantiated assertions
and that the writer in fact must obtain a written representation
about the purchaser's commercial purpose.62 In addition, the
56. Revisions to Rules for Trading Non-Agricultural Option Contracts and Termina-
tion of Pilot Program Status, 51 Fed. Reg. 17,464 (1986).
57. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 41, at 769.
58. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 17 C.F.R. § 32.12 (1986).
59. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 46,797 (1983); Expan-
sion of Pilot Program to include Options on Domestic Agricultural Commodities, 49 Fed.
Reg. 2,752 (1984). Specifically, the regulations only permit trade options to be offered on the
commodities not enumerated therein. 17 C.F.R. § 32.4(a) (1986).
60. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982 & Supp. II 1985); 17 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1986).
61. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985).
62. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 84-7, reprinted in [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,025 (February 22, 1984). In that instance, the entity making
the request was actually an exchange located in a foreign country. Under the CEA and
CFTC regulations, however, options traded other than on a regulated contract market are
considered over-the-counter options for regulatory purposes, regardless of whether they are
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CFTC staff noted that the purchaser's commercial purpose in
acquiring the option must bear a close relationship to the commod-
ity on which the option was purchased.63 For example, with respect
to foreign currencies, the staff held that a trader could not
purchase an option on Swiss francs unless it was engaged in a busi-
ness involving Swiss francs. Nevertheless, the staff stopped short
of concluding that an actual hedging purpose is required.6 4
Moreover, the CFTC has requested comment on whether trade
option writers also should be required to have a commercial pur-
pose in connection with the options they write. 5 Although the
CFTC has taken no definitive action on this point, the adoption of
such a requirement could limit substantially the extent to which
trade options are written. Furthermore, under the regulations,
trade options may not be offered on agricultural commodities. 66
The CFTC has concluded, however, that "hybrid" contracts com-
bining elements of forward delivery agreements and trade options
may be entered into on agricultural commodities.67 For example, a
forward contract between commercial entities may include a pric-
ing mechanism that permits one party, based upon a predeter-
mined formula, to receive or pay a higher or lower price at the time
of delivery.68
C. Leverage Contracts
A leverage contract is a standardized long-term contract for
the purchase or sale of a specified quantity of a given commodity
that includes, among other things, a percentage payment of the
spot price at the outset, periodic payment of a carrying charge or
fee on the unpaid balance, and repurchase of the contract from the
offered from within or without the United States.
63. Id. at 28,595.
64. Id. In fact, in a subsequent no-action letter to another exchange located outside
the United States, the CFTC staff stated that a bona fide hedge transaction, as defined
under CFTC regulations, would constitute only one example of a permissible commercial
purpose. This, however, was not held to be the only type of permissible trade option. CFTC
Division of Trading & Markets, No-Action Letter July 3, 1984. For a further discussion of
the trade option exemption, particularly as it relates to options on foreign currency, see
infra notes 216-229 and accompanying text.
65. See Regulations Permitting the Grant, Offer and Sale of Options and Physical
Commodities, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,786 (1985).
66. See Characteristics Distinguishing Cash and Forward Contracts and "Trade" Op-
tions, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,656, 39,657 (1985).
67. Id. at 39,660. See also infra notes 318-329 and accompanying text.
68. 50 Fed. Reg. 39,656, 39,660 (1985).
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customer upon the customer's demand. 9 A leverage dealer acts as
a principal and a "market maker" in all transactions with its cus-
tomers. The dealer reserves the right to cease operating as princi-
pal or broker for its customers. A leverage dealer may assure its
ability to satisfy commitments to customers by entering into an
offsetting futures position (i.e., taking a "long" position when the
dealer has an obligation to sell metals to the customer) or by segre-
gating actual metals held in inventory.70 This inventory, however,
may be pledged as collateral for bank loans.
In addition to their limitations on futures and option contracts
trading, the CEA and CFTC regulations also substantially restrict
the extent to which a person may offer leverage contracts on physi-
cal commodities.7 1 As in the case of commodity options, the CFTC
and Congress at various times have considered either the complete
prohibition of leverage transaction trading or the regulation of
such instruments as futures contracts.7 2 In addition, in 1978 the
69. S. REP. No. 850 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2087, 2114; CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 81-1, reprinted in [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,244 (September 16, 1981). See also Mat-
thews v. Monex International Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 20,791 (1979); Report of the Advisory Committee on Market Instruments to the CFTC on
Recommended Policies on Futures, Forward and Leverage Contracts and Transactions, re-
printed in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,192 (1976).
70. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2087, 2114. The Senate Report specifically described a leverage contract as:
[A]n agreement for the purchase or sale of a contract for the delivery at a later date of
a specified commodity in a standard unit and quality, or the close-out of the contract
by an offsetting transaction. The principal characteristics of the contract include: (1)
standard units, quality, and terms and conditions; (2) payment and maintenance of
'margin'; (3) close-out by an offsetting transaction or by delivery, after payment in full;
and (4) no right or interest in a specific lot of a commodity.
Id.
71. See 7 U.S.C. § 23 (1982 & Supp. 1985); 17 C.F.R. §§ 31.1-.26 (1986). Specifically,
the CEA prohibits leverage contracts trading on any commodity enumerated under the stat-
ute prior to the 1974 amendments. In addition, the Act provides that no person may
offer to enter into, enter into or confirm the execution of any transaction for the deliv-
ery of silver bullion, gold bullion or bulk silver coins or bulk gold coins, under a stan-
dardized [leverage] contract . . . contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the
[CFTC] designed to insure the financial solvency of the transaction or prevent manipu-
lation or fraud.
7 U.S.C. § 23(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
72. See Greenstone, Leverage Transactions: On Creating A Regulatory Theme, 27
EMORY L.J. 909 (1978). The legislative and regulatory history of authority over leverage
trading has been marked by continuing attempts by Congress and the CFTC to regulate
leverage contracts as futures contracts or to promulgate a separate regulatory scheme. In
addition, the SEC at one point attempted to assert jurisdiction over leverage trading by
defining a leverage transaction as an "investment contract," under the analysis discussed
below, and requiring registration as a security. See SEC v. Monex Int'l Ltd., No. 74-3634
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CFTC adopted a moratorium on the trading of leverage contracts,
although entities already in the business of offering leverage con-
tracts were permitted to continue under a "grandfather" clause in
the regulations.73
In its 1982 reauthorization process, the CFTC again sought to
obtain congressional suspension of leverage trading, but Congress
refused.7 4 To the contrary, Congress directed the CFTC to regu-
late, but not prohibit, leverage transactions. 5 Congress also
repealed the CEA provision that authorized the CFTC to treat lev-
erage contracts as futures contracts, but permitted the CFTC to
prohibit leverage contracts on any commodity if such contracts
were not being offered and sold lawfully.76
On February 13, 1984, the CFTC issued its "interim" final rules
establishing "a comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to gov-
ern the offer and sale to the public of leverage transactions for the
purchase of silver bullion, gold bullion, bulk silver coins, bulk gold
coins, copper, platinum. . . and foreign currencies. '77 Pursuant to
its congressional mandate, the CFTC imposed a host of registra-
tion, recordkeeping, and financial requirements upon leverage
transaction merchants (LTMs), although the full effect of the rules
(C.D. Cal. 1974). In the 1974 amendments to the CEA, Congress rejected attempts to regu-
late leverage contracts as futures contracts but directed the CFTC to regulate them sepa-
rately under its delegated authority. See H. R REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4853, 4900. The CFTC, however, did not
choose to regulate leverage contracts, although it did promulgate a separate anti-fraud rule
for leverage contracts in 1975. 17 C.F.R. § 31.3 (1986).
73. 17 C.F.R. §§ 31.1-.2 (1986); see also Temporary Moratorium Regarding Gold and
Silver Leverage Transactions, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,885 (1978); Temporary Moratorium Regard-
ing Leverage Transactions on Commodities other than Gold and Silver Bullion and Bulk
Coins, 44 Fed. Reg. 55,820 (1979).
74. H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3871, 4069. Congress indicated that it did not object to the CFTC's morato-
rium, provided that the CFTC would be able "quickly" to adopt a comprehensive regulatory
scheme governing leverage trading. Congress also noted that it did not wish to adopt the
moratorium by statute, because its grandfather provisions "are inherently anti-competitive
and thus contrary to the fundamental objectives of economic competition in the free market
place." Id.
75. H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3871, 4068.
76. Id. at 51, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4069.
77. Regulations of Certain Leverage Transactions, 49 Fed. Reg. 5,498 (1984). The
CFTC's release noted that although it was adopting final rules, these rules were deemed to
be "interim" for two reasons. First, the CFTC had maintained its moratorium on the regu-
lated leverage business until it had an opportunity to evaluate the efficacy of its rules. Sec-
ond, the CFTC indicated its intention to solicit additional comments on whether leverage
transaction merchants should be permitted to offer customers the opportunity to take
"short" positions in leverage contracts as well. Id.
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will not be felt immediately because the CFTC has maintained the
temporary moratorium on leverage trading.78 As adopted, the regu-
lations require persons engaged in leverage transactions to register,
a procedure that closely parallels the registration scheme for
FCMs. 79 In addition, "leverage commodities" upon which alader,
Wickersham & Taft (December 23, 1985); Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Securities Corp. (December 20, 1985); Shearson/L.6
(1986). Because futures contracts may be traded only on registered
contracts markets, no registration process analogous to SEC regis-
tration of securities has existed in the commodities market. The
registration of leverage commodities thus represents a departure
from this practice. Furthermore, net capital, segregation, reporting,
and recordkeeping requirements similar to those imposed upon
FCMs are mandatory for LTMs 1
LTMs also are governed by specific antifraud rules under
CFTC regulations, and the CFTC, as well as the courts, has pro-
vided relief to private customers who have been defrauded by lev-
erage dealers.8 2 Indeed, numerous decisions in recent years have
found violations of these rules by leverage merchants offering pre-
cious metals through "boiler room" operations.8 3 These operations
have tainted the reputation of the leverage industry.
78. Id. The regulations set forth for the first time a comprehensive definition of lever-
age contracts. See 17 C.F.R. § 31.4(w) (1986).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 31.6 (1986). The regulatory scheme adopted for LTMs and leverage
trading is substantially similar to that imposed upon FCMs and other regulated commodi-
ties professionals. For example, LTMs must register with the CFTC, and any employees
engaged in the solicitation or acceptance of customer accounts, or in the supervision of per-
sons so engaged, must register as associated persons. 17 C.F.R. §§ 3.17, 3.18 (1986). In addi-
tion, LTMs are subject to recordkeeping and reporting requirements roughly analogous to
those established with respect to FCMs. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 31.14-.15 (1986). Further, LTMs
must maintain a minimum adjusted net capital of two-and-one-half million dollars, plus
twenty percent of the market value of the physical commodities subject to uncovered lever-
age contracts. 17 C.F.R. § 31.7 (1986). LTMs, in addition, are required to prepare a disclo-
sure document along the lines of that commodity trading advisors prepare, a requirement
that is not imposed upon FCMs. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.31 (1986).
81. Id. at §§ 31.7-31.17.
82. Id. at § 31.3. See generally CFTC v. Premex, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,229 (7th Cir. 1981); Thielker v. Bonaire Trading Corp.,
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,404 (CFTC 1982); Adoption of
Anti-Fraud Rules, reprinted in [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,049 (June 17, 1975).
83. Moreira v. First National Monetary Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,914 (CFTC 1983); Campbell v. International Precious Metals Corp.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,816 (CFTC 1982); Mitchell v.
Premex, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,678 (CFTC
1983).
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In 1986 reauthorization of the CFTC again came before Con-
gress. Rejecting proposals to ban leverage transactions completely,
Congress instead adopted amendments to the CEA that prohibit
leverage contracts only on commodities other than precious met-
als.84 In addition, the amendments impose a moratorium on new
entrants into the market, pending completion of a CFTC study.85
At that time, the leverage industry will be opened to new partici-
pants, subject to new CFTC regulations.8"
III. THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
The securities industry encompasses numerous types of finan-
cial instruments and institutions and includes a far broader range
of activities and persons than the commodities industry. In many
respects, the two industries and regulatory schemes parallel each
other and, as discussed below, even overlap in several significant
areas. Nevertheless, there are many fundamental distinctions
between them that have resulted in divergent statutory and regula-
tory treatment, often of the same or similar instruments.
Primarily, the SEC regulates the securities industry although,
unlike the CFTC, the SEC does not retain exclusive jurisdiction
over all securities trading.8 7 To the contrary, the states have con-
current authority to regulate transactions in securities and related
activities within their borders.88 SEC jurisdiction, therefore, is
exclusive only at the federal level. In contrast to the trading of
futures contracts, however, which may be conducted only on a reg-
ulated contract market, securities transactions may take place over
the counter and in a range of contexts well beyond the floor of a
national securities exchange.89 As a result, SEC jurisdiction,
despite its nonexclusivity, is in many ways substantially greater
than CFTC jurisdiction.90
84. H.R. REP. No. 995, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986). The CFTC itself had proposed
removing leverage contracts from the scope of its jurisdiction entirely. See H.R. REP. No.
624, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, 27. The result of the change, had it been enacted, presuma-
bly would have been to permit the CFTC to prohibit leverage contracts only where they in
fact constituted off-exchange futures contracts.
85. H.R. REP. No. 995, 99th Cong., 2d Seas. (1986).
86. Id. At present, only two firms lawfully are engaged in a leverage business and reg-
istered pursuant to CFTC regulations.
87. See L. Loss, FuNDAmNTAs OF SEcURrTIs REGULATION 27-29 (1983).
88. Id. at 27-29.
89. Id. at 674-76.
90. In addition, the SEC retains corporate finance jurisdiction over any domestic cor-
poration meeting certain reporting requirements, thereby imposing substantive SEC regula-
tion on thousands of entities not involved in securities-related businesses. See id. at 487-92.
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The securities industry is governed by four principal statutes:
The Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act), covering the issu-
ance, offer, and sale of securities;"' The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the Exchange Act), covering regulation of brokerage firms,
exchanges, and transactions in securities;9" The Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, regulating mutual funds and other types of
pooled investment vehicles;93 and The Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (the Advisers Act), governing the activities of investment
advisers.94
Each of these statutes establishes a comprehensive set of regu-
latory requirements. The Exchange Act and SEC regulations re-
quire the registration as a broker-dealer of any person "engaged in
the business of effecting transactions in securities, but [this re-
quirement] does not include a bank," although there are exemp-
tions to this requirement. 5 Broker-dealers are subject to a perva-
sive regulatory scheme that includes net capital, reserve, and
recordkeeping requirements, which in fact served as the model for
CFTC regulations governing FCMs.96 Many other aspects of SEC
regulation also parallel CEA and CFTC jurisdiction, such as the
regulation of advisers, exchanges, and pooled investment vehicles.7
Securities themselves, however, and the manner in which their
trading is regulated, contrast sharply with the structure of futures
contracts and their treatment under the CEA. Unlike a futures
contract, a security represents not a contractual arrangement on
underlying goods or articles, but, broadly speaking, an interest of
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
92. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
93. Id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64.
94. Id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21.
95. Id. § 78(C)(a)(4). See N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BRO-
KERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 1.04 (1977) [hereinafter WOLFSON]. In this regard,
it should be noted that a determination that a particular type of financial instrument consti-
tutes a security within the meaning of the federal securities laws could result in a require-
ment that it be offered and sold solely by a registered broker-dealer. 15 U.S.C. § 70 (1982).
As noted, under the CEA, futures contracts may be traded only by and through registered
FCMs. Under the securities laws, however, as discussed more fully below, securities may be
traded over-the-counter as well as on registered exchanges. As a result, although permissible
off-exchange transactions in most instances will not require the seller to register as an FCM,
they in some instances could result in a requirement that such person register as a broker-
dealer.
96. WOLFSON, supra note 95, at 11 6.01-.15. See also Wolfson & Guttman, The Net
Capital Rules for Brokers and Dealers, 24 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1972); FERRALL, CAPITAL AND
BOOKKEEPING RULES (1962).
97. L. Loss, supra note 87, at 54-63, 689-94, 733-45; T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE
COMMODITY FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS §§ 1.01-1.62, 5.01-5.16 (1985).
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some sort in an enterprise or business. As a result, a trader's profit
or loss depends more on the success of that enterprise than on the
price fluctuations of goods or instruments that may or may not
have any relationship to the parties to the transaction.
Moreover, because of this fundamental structural distinction,
the securities laws and SEC regulations are concerned not only
with the manner in which securities are traded, but even more so
with the types and distribution of information provided to pro-
spective investors. In particular, although the CEA prohibits fu-
tures transactions and most option transactions not entered into
on a board of trade, the Securities Act requires registration of any
offering of securities, subject to a number of exemptions.98 The
basic regulatory approach, therefore, is significantly different.
The question of whether a given instrument constitutes a
security consequently will determine not whether it may be of-
fered, but, in most instances, the manner in which it may be of-
fered. 9 Nevertheless, given the extensive obligations the Securities
Act imposes upon an issuer of a registered offering of securities,
the registration requirement may operate as a practical prohibition
on the offering. 100 In one respect, however, the securities and com-
modities industries share a common feature-in many instances, it
is no easier to determine the presence of a security than it is to
identify a futures contract.
A. The Securities Act Definition of a Security
The Securities Act broadly defines a security to include:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement, collat-
eral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
98. See L. Loss, supra note 87, at 81-165, 263-296.
99. Id.
100. In particular, Securities Act registration generally requires preparation of a
detailed registration statement disclosing the financial condition and other aspects of the
issuer's business. See id. at 92-166. In addition, the issuer must comply with applicable state
"blue sky" statutes, which may require registration of the offering in one or more states.
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foregoing.'
This definition has been the subject of extensive judicial and
legal debate and has spawned probably the most extensive litera-
ture in the areas of securities and commodities regulation.10 2
Indeed, each one of the terms set forth above at one time or an-
other has been the subject of a substantial legal subindustry, as the
SEC, the courts, and the financial community have described and
categorized different types of financial arrangements. Three of the
items included in the statutory definition, however, are of principal
interest here: investment contracts; notes or other evidences of in-
debtedness; and options, warrants, or rights to subscribe to or
purchase securities.
1. Investment Contract Analysis
The majority of attention focused on the definition of a secur-
ity has been on the construction of the term "investment contract"
under the Securities Act. In a landmark decision, SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 103 the Supreme Court held that "an investment con-
tract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transac-
tion or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party. '104 In Howey the owner of some Florida
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1981 & Supp. III 1985). The other principal statutes of the
federal securities laws contain similar definitions of a "security." See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1981 & Supp. II 1985).
102. See, e.g., Arnold, "When Is a Car a Bicycle?" and Other Riddles: The Definition
of a Security Under the Federal Securities Laws, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449 (1984-85); Dar-
rell, Redefining a "Security". Is the Sale of a Business Through a Stock Transfer Subject
to the Federal Securities Laws?, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 22 (1984); Deacon & Prendergast, Defin-
ing a "Security" After the Forman Decision, 11 PAC. L.J. 213 (1980); FitzGibbon, What Is A
Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64
MINN. L. REv. 893 (1980); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW.
763 (1975); Lowenstein, The Commercial Paper Market and the Federal Securities Laws, 4
Corn'. L. REv. 128 (1981); Newton, What is a Security? A Critical Analysis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167
(1977); Orbe, A Security: The Quest For a Definition, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 220 (1984); Sonnen-
schein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions,
35 Bus. LAW. 1567 (1980); Note, Discretionary Commodity Accounts as "Securities". Apply-
ing the Howey Investment Contract Test to a New Investment Medium, 67 GEo. L.J. 269
(1978); Note, Discretionary Trading Accounts in Commodity Futures Are Not Securities
Absent Horizontal Commonality, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (1982); Casenote, The Definition of
Security: Marine Bank v. Weaver, 24 B.C.L. REv. 1053 (1983); Comment, The Federal Defi-
nition of a Security-An Examination of the "Investment Contract" Concept and the Pro-
priety of a Risk Capital Analysis Under Federal Law, 12 TaX. TECH L. REv. 911 (1981).
103. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
104. Id. at 298-99. Howey was based, in part, upon an earlier Supreme Court decision
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citrus groves sold interests in the property to investors in order to
raise capital. The sales included "land sales contracts" and "ser-
vice contracts" providing, respectively, for transfer of a portion of
the property to the investor upon payment of the full purchase
price and for servicing of the property by the company. The ser-
vice contracts gave the company full possession of the land and
complete discretion to manage the property."0 5
The Supreme Court found that the transaction's "economic
reality" dictated that an investment contract was present.106 The
company was "offering something more than fee simple interests in
land, something different from a farm or orchard coupled with
management services. They are offering an opportunity to contrib-
ute money and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enter-
prise managed and partly owned by [the company].' 07 The Court
found that the transaction essentially represented a "profit-seek-
ing" business venture. 10 8
Subsequent judicial construction and SEC interpretation of
this holding have determined that satisfaction of the Howey test
depends upon the presence of four elements: (1) an investment of
money; (2) this investment being made in a "common enterprise";
(3) an expectation of profits from the investment; and (4) this
expectation being based upon the efforts of a third party.09 In a
further refinement of the Howey definition, the Supreme Court,
some thirty years later in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. For-
man,"0 stated that a particular arrangement will constitute an
that had addressed the "investment contract" issue in more general terms. SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). In Joiner, the Court had stated only that the
Securities Act was designed to reach novel, uncommon, or irregular devices that could be
shown to have been "widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which
established their character in commerce as 'investment contracts.'" Id. at 351. The Court
held that the determination of whether a security was present must be made on a case-by-
case basis, turning on "what character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of
the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect."
Id. at 352-53. Not until Howey, however, did the Court clearly articulate the set of factors to
be examined as part of this analysis.
105. 328 U.S. at 295-96.
106. Id. at 300-01.
107. Id. at 299.
108. Id. at 300.
109. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837 (1975); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Berman v.
Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
110. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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investment contract if individuals are prompted to invest by a
"significant, realistic" expectation of "substantial" profits to be de-
rived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."1' In
that instance, participations in a housing complex did not consti-
tute investment contracts because no dividend payments were
made as an apportionment of profits and the inducement to
purchase was the acquisition of low-cost living space, not an
investment for profit. 112
The Howey line of cases, although leaving other questions
unresolved, has made it clear that participation in a pooled invest-
ment vehicle will raise a presumption of commonality and expecta-
tion of profits based on the efforts of others. For example, when an
individual deposits a specific sum of money or securities with the
knowledge and expectation that this investment will be pooled
with those of other similarly situated investors and that any profits
will be shared on a pro rata basis, this investment likely will be a
"common enterprise," the success of which is dependent upon the
efforts of a third party. The agreement between the individual
investor and the broker or other investment manager ordinarily is
found to constitute the "security" bringing the arrangement within
the scope of the Securities Act.
Although a pooling arrangement may be sufficient to support a
finding of an investment contract, it is not as clear that this finding
is necessary. For example, most courts have held that an individual
brokerage or discretionary trading arrangement between a cus-
tomer and a broker does not constitute an "investment contract"
because no common enterprise exists, although the investor clearly
is dependent upon the broker's efforts.113 The Fifth and Ninth Cir-
111. Id. at 851-54.
112. Id.
113. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). In Milnarik,
the customer deposited more than $13,000 with a broker who executed a number of transac-
tions in commodity futures contracts on behalf of the customer. The customer sought to
rescind the agreement on the ground that it was a security that had not been registered
pursuant to the Securities Act. Although the broker represented a number of investors, the
court concluded that the profit or loss of each had no bearing on that of the others. Each
contract between the customer and the broker, therefore, was held to be a separate "enter-
prise," and there was no joint participation in a common enterprise. In Hirk, the court
stated that absent a commingling of the funds of a number of investors, and the allocation
of profit or loss on a pro rata basis, no common enterprise can be established. In so holding,
the court also rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the broker had treated the funds of all
customers in a substantially identical manner, although there was no formal "pooling" of
funds. These cases and similar decisions have established the doctrine of so-called "horizon-
tal commonality." In other words, the common enterprise must exist among joint partici-
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cuits, however, have held that so-called "vertical" commonal-
ity-the common enterprise between one customer and a broker
managing the customer's funds on a discretionary basis-is suffi-
cient to support a finding of an investment contract.114
Under such circumstances, these courts have held that "uni-
formity of impact of the promoter's efforts," and not a horizontal
pooling of money, is the critical factor. These definitions, therefore,
elevate the "dependence upon the efforts of others" criterion to
principal and almost exclusive importance and clearly downgrade,
if not eliminate, the significance of the "common enterprise" re-
quirement. 115 Nevertheless, although the Supreme Court has yet to
resolve definitively this split among the circuits, the weight of au-
thority seems to favor the "horizontal" commonality approach. In
any event, it is significant that the "common enterprise" analysis
has resulted in the characterization of a number of investments
and trading relationships as investment contracts.'
2. Notes and Evidences of Indebtedness
Whether an instrument constitutes a "note" or an "evidence
of indebtedness" under the Securities Act is in some respects sim-
pler, but in others more complex, than the "investment contract"
analysis. On one hand, the most typical forms of notes or evidences
of indebtedness-promissory notes in return for loans or real
estate mortgages-almost certainly were not intended to be in-
cluded within the definition of a "security." Conversely, many
types of "notes"-such as those a publicly held corporation issues
for the purpose of raising capital-just as clearly should be in-
cluded within the securities laws' protection.
pants in the same venture.
114. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). In Turner, the court held that a
common enterprise under Howey could exist where "the fortunes of the investor are inter-
woven and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment of third
parties." 474 F.2d at 482 n.7. This so-called "vertical commonality"-the common enter-
prise between one investor and a broker-is significantly different from the horizontal com-
monality established by the majority of cases decided under Howey. In particular, vertical
commonality requires neither the pooling of customers' funds nor the interdependence of
profit or loss that Hirk and Milnarik required.
115. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1974).
116. See, e.g., Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979) (earthworms); Miller v.
Central Chichilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974) (chinchillas); Glenn-Arden Com-
modities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974) (whiskey); SEC v. Brigadoon
Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rare coin collections).
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In determining the Securities Act's application to the various
types of notes, therefore, courts generally have distinguished be-
tween notes sold or acquired for "commercial" purposes and those
purchased or acquired for "investment" reasons.117 On this basis, a
majority of the circuit courts that have addressed the issues have
held that notes will be deemed to be of an "investment" character,
and therefore subject to the Securities Act, if: (1) the assets
acquired in exchange for the notes are of the character of "invest-
ment assets"; (2) the issuance, purchase, and sale of notes are
made by persons not normally in the business of entering into the
underlying type of transaction; and (3) the note creates a long-
term indebtedness. 11
8
Several circuits have applied variations of the investment or
commercial purpose test that emphasize certain of these character-
istics over others; other circuits have applied altogether different
criteria. For example, the Seventh Circuit has accepted the invest-
ment or commercial purpose approach, but uses a "motivational"
test in applying it." 9 This analysis focuses on the note purchaser's
reasons for entering into the transaction. If the purchaser intends
the note to operate as an investment, rather than as part of a com-
mercial transaction that the purchaser entered into primarily for
nonspeculative reasons, the note is likely to be regarded as a
security. 20
117. SEC v. Diversified Indus., 465 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1979). For a general discus-
sion of the status of notes and other evidences of indebtedness as securities, see generally
Lipton & Katz, supra note 102; Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securi-
ties Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA.
L. REv. 400 (1982); Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of "Security" Under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478 (1973);
Comment, The Status of the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975
ARIz. ST. L.J. 175. As in other areas of the securities laws in which courts have been called
upon to determine whether a given instrument constitutes a security, the focus has been on
the context of the transaction rather than the labels or descriptions the parties apply. See
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). In Tcherepnin the Supreme Court stated that,
given the broad remedial purposes of the securities laws, whether a security is present
should be determined on the basis of the "economic realities" of the circumstances rather
than the labels provided to particular instruments or other factors.
118. Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First Nat'l
Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); SEC v. Diversified
Industries, 465 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1979).
119. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1009 (1972); C.N.S. Enter. v. G. & G. Enter., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
825 (1975).
120. Sanders, 463 F.2d at 1080; C.N.S. Enter., 508 F.2d at 1356-62. In Sanders, short-
term notes were found to constitute securities, because the note purchasers had bought the
notes for investment purposes. In contrast, in C.N.S. Enter., the court found that notes
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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has applied a "risk capital" test
in determining whether a note is a security.121 The issue under this
approach, which in some respects parallels the investment contract
characterization, is whether the purchaser of the note, or lender,
has "contributed risk capital subject to the 'entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts' of [others].' 22 In employing this test, the
Ninth Circuit has looked at six factors: (1) the period of time the
investment covers; (2) collateralization; (3) the obligation's form;
(4) the circumstances of issuance; (5) the relationship between the
amount borrowed and the size of the borrower's business; and (6)
the borrower's contemplated use of the funds.
123
The Second Circuit, however, adopting by far the broadest
and most sweeping definition of a "note" or "evidence of indebted-
ness," takes a literal approach to the issue. The court has held that
any note which has a maturity date exceeding nine months and is
not ordinarily delivered in connection with commercial transac-
tions (consumer financing, notes secured by mortgages on homes,
short-term notes secured by liens on businesses, or assignments of
accounts receivable), is presumed to be a security. 24 Again, as has
been the case with the investment contract analysis, the Supreme
Court has not resolved this issue definitively.
3. Options or Rights to Purchase or Sell Securities
As noted above, the Securities Act definition of a "security"
also includes "any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
executed in connection with the obligor's financing of a business purchase were not securi-
ties, because of the intended use of the funds and the nature of the transaction. It should be
noted that the motivational test is similar to the commercial or investment purpose test,
although the latter arguably looks at additional factors.
121. United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); Great West-
ern Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
122. Kotz, 532 F.2d at 1257, United California Bank, 557 F.2d at 1358. A principal
element in making this determination, therefore, may be the relationship between the par-
ties, i.e. whether one party is placing its funds at risk for management by the other party. In
this respect, the "risk capital" test is similar to the investment contract analysis. See supra
notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
123. United Cal. Bank, 557 F.2d at 1358.
124. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976); Movie-
lab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). In Exchange Nat'l Bank, Judge
Friendly noted that the standards of the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits described above
failed to provide sufficient certainty in making the necessary determination. As a result,
Judge Friendly held that when a note is encompassed under the definition of a security as a
prima facie matter, the party attempting to demonstrate that the note is not a security has
the burden of proof. See Note, supra note 117, at 416-18.
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(including any interest therein or based upon the value thereof), or
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a na-
tional securities exchange relating to foreign currency, . . . or war-
rant or right to subscribe to or purchase" a security. 2 5 Congress
added this provision to the Securities Act in 1982, partially in
response to the proliferation of new financial instruments reaching
the market at that time and as a result of the Shad-Johnson
Accord, which delineated jurisdiction over these products between
the SEC and the CFTC.1 26
Briefly stated, the CEA, as discussed more fully below, pro-
vides the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts
(and options on futures contracts) on any commodity, including
foreign currencies and securities.1 27 By the late 1970s and early
1980s, it was not clear whether, or to what extent, the CFTC had
jurisdiction over options directly on financial instruments.12 8 In an
attempt to resolve this issue, the chairmen of the CFTC and SEC
reached an agreement in 1981, designated the Shad-Johnson Ac-
cord, which subsequently was submitted to Congress in the form of
appropriate amendments to the securities laws and the CEA.1 29
The Shad-Johnson Accord granted the CFTC exclusive juris-
diction over futures contracts and options on futures contracts on
any commodity, including securities and foreign currencies, as well
as currency indexes.13 0 The CFTC was expressly prohibited, how-
ever, from approving the trading of any futures contracts or fu-
tures options on individual securities other than those issued by
the United States government.131 The CFTC also received exclu-
sive jurisdiction over options on foreign currencies not traded on a
national securities exchange. 13 2 Conversely, the SEC was granted
exclusive jurisdiction over options directly on securities, including
exempted securities and indexes of securities, as well as options on
125. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982).
126. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, reprinted in [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982); Markham & Gilberg, supra note
41, at 777-79.
127. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also Johnson, supra note 17, at 61;
Note, supra note 17, at 710.
128. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 41, at 772-76.
129. H.R. REP. No. 626, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. REP. No. 390, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982); Act of October 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409.
130. Act of October 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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foreign currency traded on a national securities exchange.'33
As a result of these amendments, options on individual securi-
ties, as well as options on indexes of securities, clearly constitute
separate securities, and they are subject to the registration provi-
sions of the Securities Act, absent an appropriate exemption.
Moreover, an exemption will not necessarily be available simply
because the security underlying the option itself is exempt from
registration.1 34 Thus, for example, an option on a municipal secur-
ity or a United States Treasury Bond presumptively is subject to
registration, regardless of the underlying instrument's exempt sta-
tus. In addition, an option on an index of such securities similarly
is subject to Securities Act registration. As a result, such products
may be lawfully offered and sold only pursuant to an effective re-
gistration statement filed under the Securities Act or through an
exemption from registration.
4. Exemptions to Securities Act Registration
The Securities Act establishes a number of exemptions from
securities registrations. First, "exempt securities," principally com-
prised of United States government securities and municipal
bonds, need not be registered.13 5 In this regard, it should be noted
that securities which a bank issues or guarantees also are exempt
securities and may be offered and sold without registration.13 6
These include a bank's own securities or another issuer's securities
that are backed by a bank guarantee or letter of credit. Further-
more, short-term commercial paper may be offered and sold with-
out Securities Act registration.23 7
One of the exemptions from registration most often relied
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., LTV Federal Credit Union v. UMIC Government Securities, Inc., [1982-
1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,193 (5th Cir. 1983).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982). An exempt security, of course, is one that falls
within the definition of a "security" but need not be registered, based upon a legislative
determination that purchasers of such instruments are not in need of the protections Securi-
ties Act registration affords. Nevertheless, because such instruments are securities, certain
of the remaining provisions of the securities laws-in particular, the anti-fraud sec-
tions-remain applicable to their offer and sale.
136. Id. In order to be entitled to this exemption from registration, the bank must
back the security in full, pursuant to a guarantee or some other type of general obligation,
such as a letter of credit. See, e.g., American Bankers Club, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,382 (August 31, 1979) (Securities
are not "issued or guaranteed" by bank when there is no obligation directly enforceable
against the bank).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1982).
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upon, however, is the so-called "private placement" or "private of-
fering" exemption established under section 4(2) of the Securities
Act. 138 That provision states that the registration requirement does
not apply to sales of securities "not involving any public offering"
and is intended primarily to encompass privately negotiated trans-
actions among related parties.' The securities laws, however, long
have reflected an understanding that certain investors, by virtue of
their expertise, sophistication, or wealth, do not require the protec-
tions provided under these statutes and should be permitted to
purchase securities regardless of their registration status.1 40 This
approach has found its clearest expression in the interpretation of
section 4(2) of the Securities Act, which has been construed to per-
mit sales of unregistered securities to "accredited investors," sub-
ject to a number of conditions.14 '
Moreover, in 1982 the SEC adopted a safe harbor rule, known
as "Regulation D," which clarified and expanded small offering
and private placement exemptions previously contained in SEC
138. Id. § 77d(2) (1982).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Continental To-
bacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). See
also, e.g., SEC Rel. No. 33-6274 (Dec. 23, 1980) (regarding "institutional-type" individuals
"with sufficient experience, expertise, and financial clout to protect their own interests
[who] do not need the SEC to obtain adequate information about a company in which they
invest-they can get this information themselves"). See also SEC Rel. No. 33-6180 (Jan. 17,
1980); SEC Rel. No. 6121 (Sept. 11, 1979); SEC Rel. No. 6121 (Sept. 11, 1979); Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980).
Recently, the SEC has determined that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prohibi-
tions against an investment adviser's imposition of a performance or incentive fee should
not apply in all instances to advisory contracts with:
persons who, because of their wealth and financial knowledge and experience, [are]
considered to be less dependent on the protections which the performance fee prohibi-
tion is intended to provide. . . . The [SEC] has concluded that it is consistent with
the protection of investors and the purposes of the [Investment Advisers] Act to permit
clients who are financially experienced and able to bear the risks associated with per-
formance fees to have the opportunity to negotiate compensation arrangements which
they and their advisers consider appropriate.
SEC Rel. No. IA-996 (Nov. 14, 1985).
141. See Ketels, Regulation D-The New Regulatory World for Limited Offerings, 5
CoRP. L. REv. 268 (1982); Newman & Goldenberg, Venture Capital Formation Under the
SEC's New Regulation D, Nat'l. L. J., July 5, 1982, at 16. Section 2(15) of the Securities Act
defines the term "accredited investor" to include certain large institutional investors, such
as banks, insurance companies, registered investment companies, business development
companies and certain employee benefit plans. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (1982). In addition, sec-
tion 2(15) authorizes the SEC to promulgate regulations to broaden the definition to include
any other persons who, in its view, are sufficiently sophisticated, knowledgeable, and exper-
ienced in financial matters so as not to need the protection that registration affords. Id.
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rules. 142 Regulation D is comprised of six separate regulations
promulgated under the Securities Act. Offerings that comply with
the regulation will be presumed not to be "public offerings," ren-
dering them exempt from registration.'4 s
The most significant aspect of Regulation D is the definition
of the term "accredited investor," which includes not only tradi-
tional institutional investors but also a large number of individu-
als.144 In particular, the rule encompasses sales of unregistered
securities to individuals who (1) have a net worth in excess of
1,000,000 dollars; (2) have annual incomes of greater than 200,000
dollars; or (3) purchase at least 150,000 dollars of the investment
at issue, but only if such investment does not exceed twenty per-
cent of the purchaser's net worth.145 The substantive provisions of
Regulation D allow three separate types of offerings to be made,
based upon the amount of the offering. First, offerings of up to
500,000 dollars may be made regardless of the purchasers' status
and in the absence of any specific disclosure. 146 Second, offerings of
up to 5,000,000 dollars may be made to an unlimited number of
accredited investors and up to thirty-five nonaccredited inves-
tors.' 47 With respect to nonaccredited investors, Regulation D im-
poses no sophistication or other qualification tests. Finally, under
the actual safe harbor portion of the rule, an unlimited dollar
amount of securities may be offered to any number of persons.148
Sales, however, only may be made to thirty-five nonaccredited but
"qualified" purchasers and to an unlimited number of accredited
investors. 49
142. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506 (1986); SEC Rel. No. 33-6389 (Mar. 8, 1982).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506 (1986); SEC Rel No. 33-6389 (Mar. 8, 1982). Regulation
D replaced a series of SEC regulations promulgated under section 4(2) of the Securities Act
that previously had constituted the "safe harbor" for private offerings. Regulation D, how-
ever, is substantially broader than these prior regulations. See, e.g., Casey, SEC Rules 144
and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOKLYN L. R-v. 571 (1977); Marsh, Who Killed the Private Offering
Exemption?, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 470 (1976); Schneider, Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31
Bus. LAw 485 (1975).
144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1986). With respect to institutions, the definition encom-
passes banks, insurance companies, registered investment companies, small business devel-
opment companies, private business development companies, and organizations with more
than $5,000,000 in assets covered by section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
145. That definition also includes the issuer's directors, executive officers, and general
partners.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1986).
147. Id. § 230.505.
148. Id. § 230.506.
149. Id. Qualification for the non-accredited investors need not be determined prior to
the making of an offer, but it must be completed before consummation of the sale. With
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Regulation D is of major significance not only to corporate
issuers, but, as discussed below, also to institutions offering finan-
cial products that arguably could be characterized as securities. On
the basis of this series of regulations, such an institution ordinarily
can be assured that it may offer a particular type of instrument
under the securities laws provided that it is willing to restrict the
manner in which offers and sales are made and the scope of per-
missible offerees. Moreover, because most of the securities-type in-
struments developed and offered today are directed toward institu-
tional market participants, this latter constraint in practice may
not alter substantially an issuer's proposal. In many instances,
therefore, Regulation D provides a viable alternative to Securities
Act registration.
B. The Investment Company Act of 1940
Another of the principal federal securities statutes is the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 (ICA), which regulates the activi-
ties of mutual funds and other vehicles for pooled investments in
securities.1 50 Although the mutual fund industry, which is the prin-
cipal focus of the ICA, is beyond the scope of this Article, the ICA
nevertheless has direct relevance to the* offer and sale of many
recently developed financial products because of the possible inclu-
sion of such instruments within the ICA's definition of an "invest-
ment company." In particular, many products or trading arrange-
ments may fall within the so-called "inadvertant investment
company" rubric, thereby invoking the ICA's terms. Such a result
would have a dramatic adverse effect on any institution's ability to
offer such a product, because the ICA imposes an extensive and
often extremely burdensome set of regulations covering virtually
respect to the "safe harbor," and the permissibility of offerings of up to five million dollars,
offerees must receive specific types of disclosure regarding the issuer and the security. More-
over, in contrast to the de minimus exemption for offerings of up to $500,000, the latter two
exemptions prohibit any general advertising or solicitation. As a result, offerors seeking to
avail themselves of the safe harbour may communicate with potential purchasers only
through direct and individual contacts, or through private negotiations, although there need
not have been a pre-existing investment relationship between the parties. See, e.g., Wood-
trails-Seattle Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 2, 1982); Mineral Lands Research & Mar-
keting Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 4, 1985).
150. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1982). The ICA perhaps is the most complex and
extensive of all the federal securities statutes; it establishes a detailed set of requirements
for entities subject to its jurisdiction. Such entities must adopt a corporate structure accord-
ing to a specific form, and must comply continuously with numerous reporting, recordkeep-
ing, voting, proxy, disclosure, and other requirements. See T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF
MONEY MANAGERS 199-203 (1978); L. Loss, supra note 87, at 144-53.
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every aspect of the issuer's business, such as records, reports, and
board of directors' management. 151
The ICA establishes two alternative tests for determining
whether a given entity constitutes an investment company. The
first is a more subjective test that defines an investment company
as any issuer that "is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily,
or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, rein-
vesting, or trading in securities. ' 152 This definition is intended to
encompass the more conventional type of investment company,
which is in the business of investing in securities and holds itself
out as such. The test, therefore, describes a set of activities that in
many, if not most, instances will be readily identifiable, although
determining investment company status under this approach re-
quires consideration of an entity's total activities. In addition, the
entity actually must be trading or investing in securities and not
merely holding them.153 Furthermore, the "holding out" element
establishes a solicitation aspect that might exclude a number of
entities presumptively within the scope of the statute. 54
The principal issue under this test, however, is the "primarily
engaged" criterion. The SEC has stated that this issue should be
resolved through an analysis of a number of factors, including the
entity's investment history; its representations to the public; its of-
ficers' and directors' activities; the nature of its assets; and the
source of its income. 155 If, for example, an entity has traded exten-
sively in securities and derived a substantial amount of its income
from securities, those factors may create a presumption of invest-
ment company status.
Conversely, the second approach under the ICA involves a
more objective analysis designed to capture the "inadvertant in-
vestment company," which often is an issuer that does not purport
or intend to be characterized as an investment company but essen-
tially operates as an investment company because a large portion
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1982).
152. Id. § 80a-3(a)(1).
153. See SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
afl'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
154. Committee on Commodities Reg., Bar Ass'n City of New York, '40 Acts' Applica-
bility to Commodity Pools and Trading Advisors, 37 Bar Ass'n Rec. 611, 632 (1982).
155. Moses v. Black [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,866
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Tonopah Mining Co. of Nevada, 26 S.E.C. 426, 427 (1947), citing, Bankers
Securities Corp., 15 S.E.C. 695, afl'd sub nom. Bankers Securities Corp. v. SEC, 146 F.2d 88
(3d Cir. 1944); T. FRANKEL, supra note 150, at 221-24; Kerr, The Inadvertent Investment
Company: Section 3(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, 12 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1959).
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of its assets are invested in securities. 156 This provision defines an
"investment company" as an issuer that "is engaged or proposes to
engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or
trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment
securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of
such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and
cash items) on an unconsolidated basis. 157
This definition contains a number of significant distinctions
from the subjective test set forth above. First, there is no require-
ment that the entity be "primarily engaged" in the business of in-
vesting or trading in securities. To the contrary, "holding" or
"owning" securities may be sufficient provided that the entity
meets the asset test. Second, the entity may be characterized as an
investment company when the value of the securities it holds
reaches forty percent of its assets. This element can be extremely
troublesome for many entities with large securities portfolios,
because an increase in a portfolio's value resulting from market
fluctuations, if the entity's other assets do not similarly increase in
value, could increase the portion of the entity's assets invested in
securities to the forty percent level, thereby triggering the ICA re-
quirements. Moreover, the statute becomes applicable if this objec-
tive test is met at any time, even if the percentage of the entity's
assets invested in securities subsequently falls below forty
percent.158
Nevertheless, the SEC has promulgated rules that would pre-
vent an entity from being characterized as an investment company
even if it presumptively is within the statute by virtue of the asset
test.159 The first regulation provides that an entity meeting this
test will not be deemed an investment company if securities consti-
tute no more than forty-five percent of its total asset value and
amount to no more than forty-five percent of its net income after
156. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1982); see also Kerr, supra note 155. The problem of the
inadvertent investment company is one of extreme importance for entities developing and
offering new financial instruments. If a particular product results in the entity itself, or a
"pool" established by the entity, being deemed an investment company, a dramatic restruc-
turing of the operation will be required; in fact, it is more likely that such a result simply
will force the offeror to abandon its program. Moreover, by definition, the "inadvertent"
problem could arise simply as a result of fluctuations in the value of an entity's assets,
without any conscious or deliberate action on its part.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1982).
158. Committee on Commodities Reg., supra note 154, at 630.
159. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.3a-1-.3a-2 (1986).
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taxes. 16 0 By allowing forty-five percent of the entity's asset value to
be invested in securities, as opposed to forty percent under the
statute, the SEC rule provides some additional flexibility.
In a second rule, the SEC has stated that an entity will not be
deemed an investment company during a period of time of up to
one year, provided it has a bona fide intent to engage, as soon as is
reasonably practicable, in a business other than securities invest-
ment.' Finally, the ICA exempts an entity whose outstanding
securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by
not more than one hundred persons and that is not making and
does not propose to make a public offering of its securities. 1 6 This
exemption is qualified, however, by the requirement that the com-
putation of the number of holders include the securities holders of
any entity holding more than ten percent of the presumptive in-
vestment company's voting securities, if such equity ownership
represents more than ten percent of the entity's asset value.16 3
IV. SEC-CFTC JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS
The futures industry originally centered exclusively on futures
and option contracts on agricultural commodities.16 4 Indeed, so-
called financial futures did not even exist until the early 1970s.' 65
As a result, at the time of its formation, the CFTC primarily was
intended to regulate trading in agricultural futures and options. In
addition, Congress concluded that the nature of a futures contract
was distinct from a security and that CFTC jurisdiction should be
delineated on the basis of this distinction. 66
As a result, the 1974 amendments to the CEA, which created
the CFTC, granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over all trans-
160. Id. § 270.3a-1.
161. Id. § 270.3a-2. The one year period commences when the value of an entity's cash
or securities exceeds fifty per cent of its total asset value, or when the value of its invest-
ment securities exceeds forty percent of its total asset value. Id. At the conclusion of the one
year period, however, the entity once again is subject to the possibility of ICA registration.
162. 15 U.S.C. ] 8a-]3(c)(1) (1982).
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; see also Markham & Gilberg,
supra note 41, at 769.
165. Fitzgerald, Innovations in Financial Futures, BANKER, April 1983, at 95; Mark-
ham & Gilberg, supra note 3, at 1721; Yeutter, supra note 15, at 64-66.
166. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 61; Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and
General Legislation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 171-72 (1978) (Statement of Robert K. Wilmouth, President of the Chicago
Board of Trade) [hereinafter Reauthorization Hearings].
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actions in futures contracts and options on physical commodi-
ties.167 In addition, as noted, Congress in 1974 significantly ex-
panded the definition of "commodity" for the purposes of CFTC
jurisdiction, thereby broadening its scope to cover foreign curren-
cies, certain securities, and a wide variety of other types of
instruments. 16
Nevertheless, in an attempt to limit whatever encroachment
on SEC jurisdiction might have resulted, Congress included a pro-
vision in the CEA stating that "nothing contained in this section
shall. . . supersede or limit the jurisdiction . . . conferred on the
Securities and Exchange Commission. "169 This savings clause was
designed to assure continued SEC jurisdiction over transactions in
securities, notwithstanding the CFTC's exclusive control over fu-
tures trading in all commodities, including futures contracts on se-
curities.170 This attempt, however, was doomed virtually from the
start. First, as noted above, the federal securities laws define a "se-
curity" to include any right or contract to purchase a security.1 71
This definition unquestionably encompasses any futures or options
contract on a security or group of securities. By the very terms of
the relevant statutes, therefore, the jurisdictional issue had not
been resolved.
Moreover, the explosion in the financial futures markets began
almost immediately after the formation of the CFTC. In 1975 the
CFTC granted the Chicago Board of Trade's (CBT's) application
for designation as a contract market in the trading of futures con-
tracts on GNMA certificates. 172 Shortly thereafter, the Chicago
Board of Trade and a number of other commodity exchanges be-
167. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, 1395 (1974); Johnson, supra note 17, at § 1.01.
168. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Act of 1974: Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Committee on Agriculture,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
169. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88th Stat. 1389, 1395
§a 201(b) (1974). See also Securities Exchange Commission-Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Jurisdictional Correspondence, compiled at [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,117 [hereinafter cited as SEC-CFTC Jurisdictional Corre-
spondence]; SEC v. Univest, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,116 (N.D. Ill. 1975); SEC v. Norton, Inc., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 20,204 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Guttman, The Futures Trading Act of 1978: The
Reaffirmation of CFTC-SEC Coordinated Jurisdiction over Security/Commodities, 28 AM.
U. L. REV. 1 (1978).
170. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Nevertheless, the "savings" clause stated
that SEC jurisdiction over transactions in securities was to be maintained only where such
transactions do not involve the purchase or sale of securities futures contracts. Id.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982); see supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
172. SEC-CFTC Jurisdictional Correspondence, supra note 169, at 20,831.
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gan trading futures contracts on a broad range of financial instru-
ments, such as United States Treasury bonds and Treasury bills.17"
This action precipitated a sharp dispute between the CFTC and
the SEC that was heightened further, as discussed below, five years
later by the SEC's decision to allow options trading on the same
instruments.17 4
In a 1975 letter to the CFTC, SEC Chairman Roderick Hills
stated that "GNMA certificates and Treasury bills are securities,
as that term is defined in the federal securities laws. We also
believe it to be quite clear that contracts for future delivery of
those securities are also 'securities.' ,17' The letter urged greater
SEC and CFTC cooperation in defining each agency's jurisdic-
tional boundaries, and it requested that the CFTC refrain from
any further authorization of trading in securities futures.176
In response to this letter, the CFTC's Office of General Coun-
sel prepared and issued a lengthy memorandum, which detailed
the bases of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction and attempted to
refute the SEC's assertion of jurisdiction over GNMA futures.1 77
The memorandum concluded that Congress had vested in the SEC
authority over securities and options on securities, but had granted
exclusive regulatory control over commodity options and all
futures contracts, including those on securities, to the CFTC. 78
In Congress' 1978 reauthorization of the CFTC, the SEC and
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) again stressed the
similarity between futures contracts and options on securities,
arguing that because the two are functionally indistinguishable and
because the SEC has jurisdiction over the latter, the SEC also
should have jurisdiction over the former.179 The CFTC and the
173. CFTC Release No. 92-75 (Nov. 26, 1975); CFTC Release No. 323-77 (Aug. 2,
1977).
174. SEC-CFTC Jurisdictional Correspondence, supra note 169, at 20,831.
175. Id. at 20,829.
176. Id. at 20,829-31.
177. Id. at 20,831-41.
178. Id. at 20,831-33, citing S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974).
179. Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10,285 Before the House
Subcommittee on Conservation and Credit of the House Committee on Agriculture, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 182-219 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Hearings]. The principal
spokesmen for the SEC position in the 1978 hearings were Harold M. Williams, Chairman of
the SEC, and Joseph W. Sullivan, President of the CBOE. Williams argued that futures on
securities inevitably affect the market in the underlying securities because the commodities
and securities markets are interrelated: "And yet, there is confusion regarding the extent to
which persons trading these securities in the form of futures contracts are regulated by the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission and the extent to which persons purchasing such
securities may rely upon the protections of the federal securities laws." Id. at 782. The
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commodities exchanges, however, continued to maintain that a
futures contract, as an instrument, is functionally distinct from a
security and should not be regulated as a security. s0 To complicate
matters even further, both the Treasury and the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) submitted proposals to Congress in 1978. The
Treasury argued that it should have at least some authority over
futures contracts on government securities, and the GAO sup-
ported the SEC's position.' 8" Nevertheless, Congress retained the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. Congress, however, did enact a pro-
vision requiring the CFTC to "maintain communications" with the
SEC, the Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve Board in
areas of overlapping concern and to "take into consideration"
these agencies' views in approving applications for trading in
futures on government securities.' 82
This resolution, however, did little, if anything, to alleviate the
conflict. New escalation began in 1981 when the CBOE applied to
the SEC for permission to trade options on GNMA certificates. 83
The SEC approved the application and concluded that it had
exclusive jurisdiction over any options on securities traded on a
SEC's interest in the securities underlying these futures contracts and its significantly more
extensive experience in options trading, Williams argued, warranted SEC regulation of their
trading. Id. at 189-91. Sullivan stated that "because the SEC has historically regulated secu-
rities and securities markets in general, it is appropriate and necessary that the SEC's juris-
diction extend to futures contracts and options with respect to securities." Id. at 216. He
advocated the redrafting of the CFTC's jurisdictional role, which would grant the CFTC
exclusive jurisdiction only over futures trading on traditional commodities. Id. at 218-19.
Significantly, the CBOE was created in order to provide a futures-type market for the
trading of options on securities. See ROBERT R. NATHAN Assoc., INC., PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS
OF A FUTURES-TYPE MARKET IN OPTIONS ON SECURITIES (1969); Board of Trade v. SEC, 677
F.2d 1137, 1140 n.2 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982). Prior to the CBOE's
creation, options on securities only had been tradeable privately or in the over-the-counter
market. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 41, at 742-46. The SEC regulates the CBOE as
a national securities exchange, and the CBOE operates in the same manner as other na-
tional securities exchanges trading options. Nevertheless, based upon its purpose and ori-
gins, the CBOE retains many of the features of a commodities exchange. Id.
180. Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 166, at 171-72 (statement of Robert K.
Wilmouth). Mr. Wilmouth, President of the Chicago Board of Trade, testified that an allo-
cation of jurisdiction along the lines suggested by Williams and Sullivan would not be feasi-
ble, because futures contracts, either on commodities or financial instruments, are distinct
from any form of security and constitute a functionally separate type of trading vehicle.
181. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 33-34 (1978); H.R. CONY. REP. No.
1628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978).
182. Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (1978). See H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 45-46 (1978).
183. SEC Rel. No. 34-17,577 (Feb. 26, 1981); SEC Rel. No. 34-16,801 (May 12, 1980).
See also Report of the Joint Treasury-SEC-Federal Reserve Board Study of the Govern-
ment Related Securities Markets, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1980).
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national securities exchange.184 Immediately thereafter, the CBT
challenged the SEC's action in the Seventh Circuit. The CBT
argued that a GNMA certificate is a commodity under the CEA
and options on GNMA certificates are within the CFTC's exclusive
jurisdiction. 185 Before the court could take any definitive action,
however, the chairmen of the CFTC and the SEC entered into the
Shad-Johnson Accord, which attempted to divide jurisdiction over
financial instruments between the regulatory bodies. 8 6 Neverthe-
less, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Accord could have no ef-
fect until Congress enacted its provisions. Therefore, the court did
not consider the Accord in rendering the decision. 87
Instead, a divided court held that the CFTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over GNMA options and that the SEC had exceeded
its jurisdiction in authorizing their trading on the CBOE.188 Noting
that much of the regulatory division between options and futures
was "fortuitous," the court stated that "had the plan [for exchange
traded options] emerged after the 1974 Amendments to the Com-
modity Exchange Act, when the term 'commodity' was broadened
to encompass securities and the CFTC was awarded exclusive reg-
ulatory jurisdiction, the Chicago Board of Trade could have re-
tained its original objective of trading securities futures contracts
on its own floor under the same statute-the Commodity Exchange
Act-governing its other activities."' 89
After reviewing the legislative history, the court further con-
cluded that Congress, in granting the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction
over commodity options, intended to authorize SEC jurisdiction
184. SEC Rel. No. 34-17,577 (Feb. 26, 1981); SEC Rel. No. 34-17,005 (July 24, 1980).
185. Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1146 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S.
1026 (1982).
186. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, reprinted in [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982) [hereinafter Shad-Johnson Accords].
187. 677 F.2d 1137, 1142 n.8 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
188. Id. at 1144-54.
189. Id. at 1140 n.2 (emphasis original). The CBT noted in its brief that the CBOE's
president had testified before Congress that the "economic similarities between options and
futures, and their relationship to underlying securities are well known to market economists
.... Suffice it to say that because of the economic characteristics that options and futures
have in common, there are many circumstances when both options and futures may be used
for the same purpose." 1978 House Hearings, supra note 179, at 217. In addition, the CBT
quoted SEC Chairman Williams' 1978 statement that "despite the technical differences
between futures on securities and options on securities, in a pragmatic vein the two invest-
ment vehicles are distinctly similar. At the most basic level, the prices of both futures on
securities and options on securities are primarily dependent on the same factor-the price
of the underlying security." Id. at 194-95.
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only over options on equity securities or corporate debt instru-
ments. 90 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Shad-Johnson Ac-
cord through appropriate amendments to the CEA and the federal
securities statutes.191 These statutory amendments broadly define
the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction as extending to all futures con-
tracts and options on futures contracts, regardless of the underly-
ing commodity or instrument, while the SEC retains exclusive
jurisdiction over options on individual securities. 92 In particular,
the CFTC retains exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts on
individual government securities or on indices of stocks and mu-
nicipal bonds and over options on such futures contracts. 193 The
CFTC may not approve trading in futures contracts on individual
equity or municipal securities. 94 In contrast, the SEC retains ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all options on securities, including exempt
securities and exempt securities indices. 95 With respect to options
on foreign currencies, the SEC has jurisdiction when those instru-
ments are traded on a national securities exchange. The CFTC has
jurisdiction in all other instances.196 Currency options, therefore,
represent the only instance to date when jurisdiction is determined
by the forum in which the instrument is traded.
V. APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES
LAWS TO NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
A. Interest Rate Products
Many of the new financial products available today developed
as a result of the dramatically increased interest rate and foreign
190. 677 F.2d at 1159-60.
191. Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982); See H.R. 5447, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); 128 Cong. Rec. S. 14,813 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982); H.R. REP. No. 626, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982); S. REP. No. 390, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
192. H.R. REP. No. 626, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. (1982).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. It should be noted that, with its enactment into law, the Shad-Johnson
Accord did not end the jurisdictional disputes between the SEC and the CFTC. In particu-
lar, shortly thereafter, a new conflict developed over the trading of so-called "sub-indexes"
on groups of securities. See What's New in Commodities-Another Way to Hedge: Sub-
Indexes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1982, at F21; New Batch of Options Expected, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 24, 1983, at D9. After months of fierce industry battles, however, most of the sub-
indexes were shelved, due either to regulatory hurdles or simple lack of market interest. See
CFTC Puts Four CME Sub-Indexes on Hold After SEC Complains, FIN. FUTURES, Jan.
10,1983, at 8; Equity, Commodity Options Execs Clash Over New Product Regulation, FIN.
FuTUREs, Mar. 14, 1983, at 9.
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currency risk incurred by most corporations, and even some indi-
viduals, doing business internationally. With the rapid fluctuations
in interest and foreign exchange rates in the last decade, virtually
every commercial enterprise and private investor has found itself
subject to a growing variety of pressures and a parallel need to
protect as much as possible against these influences. One result of
this need has been the development of "swap" agreements, which
allow parties to shift risks that would otherwise be experienced in
commercial transactions.
Swap arrangements, in essence, constitute simultaneous for-
ward contracts. In its simplest terms, an interest rate swap restruc-
tures debt obligations by changing the nature of interest payments
from floating to fixed or fixed to floating, Libor-based to prime or
prime to Libor-based.'97 Typically, two parties, one with a floating
rate debt obligation and one with a fixed rate debt obligation on
identical principal amounts, agree to swap interest payments on
their obligations. Because it is unlikely that the two parties have
obtained credit on the same terms, however, the weaker credit
often pays the stronger credit a premium for the swap. In addition,
the principal does not change hands. To the contrary, payments
are netted out so that only a net difference flows from one party to
the other.'98
In many swap transactions one or both of the parties may be
required to deposit collateral, in cash or securities, equal to the
value of that entity's exposure, in order to secure its obligations to
197. See The Incredible World of Swaps, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1983 at 61; Standardising
Swaps Documentation, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1985, at 11-15; Inside the Swaps Market,
INTERMARKET, Feb. 1986, at 27-38. Swaps developed as a result of the tremendous and
unprecedented fluctuations in interest rates that began to occur in the 1970s. As a result of
the availability of higher interest rates in the United States, huge amounts of capital began
to flow into the United States while, at the same time, domestic corporations sought lower
rate financing in the burgeoning Eurobond market. The first interest rate swaps, therefore,
were just a part of the currency swaps, described below. With the growth of cheaper, floating
rate financing in the early 1980s, however, the first "pure" interest rate swaps were estab-
lished, prompted by the desire of floating rate obligors to obtain lower financing rates while
still retaining the ability to fix the rates at some point in time. Inside the Swaps Market,
INTERMARKET, Feb. 1986, at 28-30. Entities seeking to limit interest rate exposure could of
course enter into hedging transactions in futures and option contracts, primarily on Trea-
sury bills, notes and bonds. Nevertheless, futures contracts, as noted, are standardized,
while swaps can be tailored to an institution's particular needs. In addition, futures con-
tracts for the most part extend only about two years into the future, and trading activity is
generally concentrated in the nearby months. See The $150 Billion Baby, BARRON'S, Aug.
19, 1985, at 15, 36-39.
198. See supra note 197. See also INTERNATONAL SWAP DE.AEs' Assoc., CODE OF
STANDARD WORDING, ASSUMPTIONS AND PROVISIONS FOR SWAPS § 9.2 (1985).
1986] 1641
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the other party.199 As interest rates fluctuate, thereby increasing or
reducing this exposure, the party depositing collateral likely will be
required to provide additional collateral or will have excess collat-
eral released to it. Most swap agreements also include liquidated
damages clauses, which usually are extremely complex, that
require a party seeking to close out a transaction to pay a settle-
ment to the other party.200 This type of provision, therefore, essen-
tially allows liquidation of swap positions by one or both parties.
Swaps often are executed through an intermediary, rather
than directly between the two principals to the arrangements.
These agreements, known as "double swaps" are substantively
identical to the swaps described above, except that the intermedi-
ary interposes itself between the two principals.2 1 The parties may
desire the intermediary for a variety of reasons. For example, the
parties may be unwilling to accept the risk of nonpayment and
therefore may wish to have the additional protections provided by
a reputable bank or brokerage firm undertaking the other party's
obligations. In addition, the availability of an intermediary sub-
stantially involved in the swap business may make it easier for a
party to find a suitable and willing second party.
In double swaps, each party deals solely with the intermediary
and might not even know the other party's identity.20 2 The inter-
mediary enters into a separate agreement with each borrower that,
in effect, guarantees the receipt of the swap payment due from the
other party. The intermediary receives a fee for this service based
upon the principal amount of the borrowing covered by the swap
or upon the interest rate payments to be made. Although the inter-
mediary undertakes each party's obligations vis-a-vis the other
party, the actual risk incurred often is limited because the exe-
cuted agreements may require the intermediary to make payments
to one party only if offsetting payments have been received from
the other.203 Accordingly, the intermediary acts more in the capac-
199. See Inside the Swaps Market, INTERMARKET, Feb. 1986, at 38; Rate Swaps Draw
Concern, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1985, at D1.
200. Rate Swaps Draw Concern, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1985, at Dl. See INTERNATIONAL
SWAP DEALERS' AssoCIATrN, supra note 198, at §§ 12.1-.6 (1985).
201. Interest-Rate Swaps Catch On At Banks, Thrifts, AM. BANKER, May 4, 1983, at
9; Banks' Swap Business Booms, AM. BANKER, June 10, 1985, at 17; The $150 Billion Baby,
BARRON's, Aug. 19, 1985, at 36-39.
202. See supra note 201.
203. Id. The use of banks and other institutions as intermediaries in connection with
swaps, however, has raised serious concerns among banking regulatory authorities and
others over the risk incurred. In particular, the intermediary actually may assure each party
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ity of a clearinghouse or banker than as an actual principal to or
guarantor of the agreements.
As might be expected, swap agreements have become tradable
financial instruments among the institutions involved. This trading
essentially involves the transfer of the rights and obligations un-
dertaken by one party to an agreement to another party not in-
volved in the original agreement.20 4 As the swap market has grown
and developed, the existence of numerous swap agreements in a
wide variety of forms has enabled many entities to enter into such
agreements without the requirement of finding a suitable second
party at the outset. Instead, an intermediary may sell the party a
swap previously entered into by another entity that has decided it
no longer needs or desires the agreement.
Another type of interest rate protection program that banks,
brokerage firms, and other financial institutions offer is the "ceil-
ing" or "floor" product. A typical ceiling rate instrument generally
involves a financial institution's sale of a fixed commitment to
make payments to the purchaser if interest rates rise to a stated
level. For example, an institution may enter into an agreement
with a customer that assures the customer of an interest rate ceil-
ing on borrowed funds, which may be subject to a variable interest
rate. For a fee, the institution will agree to pay the customer the
difference in interest between that rate and an indexed rate speci-
fied in the agreement, multiplied by a given principal amount.
of the other's payment and obligate itself to pay the fixed or floating amounts if one party
defaults, although the intermediary is not liable for principal payments. See Rate Swaps
Draw Concern, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1985, at D1; Inside the Swaps Market, INTERMARKET,
Feb. 1986, at 38. Moreover, because the intermediary, in effect, is fully hedged-one party's
payment obligations offset those of the other party-the intermediary's liabilities under the
swap ordinarily are not disclosed on financial statements nor included on balance sheets.
Rate Swaps Draw Concern, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1985, at D1. This "off-balance sheet risk,"
however, has increased regulatory authorities' concern over the potential for abuse. As a
result, both the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board have im-
plemented guidelines for the institutions under their supervision to reduce their exposure
with respect to swaps. Federal Reserve Board Release, reprinted in [1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Bank. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,858) (Feb. 9, 1984). In fact, the concept of "swap futures"
has been proposed as a means of dealing with this intermediary risk. See Inside the Swaps
Market, INTERMARKET, Feb. 1986, at 38.
204. Our Wildest Dreams, FoRBEs, July 30, 1984, at 53, 56-57; The Incredible World
of Swaps, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1983, at 60-75. Indeed, the Chase Manhattan Bank in New
York now provides a computer service that allows traders to get up-to-the-minute interest
rate swap quotations. INSIDE THE SwAPS MARKET. INTERMARKET, Feb. 1986, at 36. The sys-
tem, known as CHESS (Chase Electronic Swap System), may be accessed by a personal
computer, and gives comparisons between swaps and other types of financial instruments,
such as financial futures, commercial loans, and private placements. Id.
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Similarly, the institution also may enter into an agreement that
assures an individual or entity seeking to invest funds or property
to be acquired or obtained in the future that it will receive not less
than a stated amount of interest for a specific period of time. Of-
ferors generally do not repurchase their obligations under these in-
terest rate agreements, although they may do so under certain cir-
cumstances. The agreements ordinarily are not transferable or
assignable and, for the most part, are sold only to large or institu-
tional customers that require interest rate protection in connection
with their trade or business. An institution may offer this type of
interest rate product either in connection with a loan or deposit
with that institution or without any connection to the customer's
other business conducted with the institution.
Financial institutions also may offer options on interest rates.
These options provide customers the right, but not the obligation,
to obtain, at a specified time in the future, an interest rate on bor-
rowed money that is no higher than a fixed ceiling or, in the case of
funds to be deposited, a rate no lower than a stated floor. The cus-
tomer, however, is not obligated in either instance to exercise its
right, but simply may allow it to lapse.
A customer anticipating the receipt of a loan at a rate to be
determined in the future, therefore, may be assured of a rate no
higher than an agreed upon level in return for the payment of a
nonrefundable premium. If interest rates rise above that level, the
customer can exercise the option and receive the difference be-
tween the actual rate and that specified in the contract. As a
result, the customer, for the cost of the premium, will have pro-
tected itself sufficiently against fluctuations in its loan rate. Simi-
larly, a customer seeking to deposit funds at a future date may
purchase a forward contract that assures a return of no less than a
stated amount. If the rate the customer later receives on those
funds is below that specified in the agreement, the customer, at its
election, may exercise its right to receive the difference from the
offeror.
In most instances, these instruments do not appear to contain
the elements of an "investment contract" described above and,
therefore, may not be subject to SEC regulation as securities.0 5
Although an investment of money arguably occurs, it is difficult to
claim that the "investor" is dependent in any way upon the efforts
of a third party, and no pooling of investments is apparent, at least
205. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
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in the context of a bilateral swap or ceiling rate agreement. More
to the point, however, these contracts do constitute "evidences of
indebtedness" because one party is obligated to make payments to
another, either as a fixed requirement or dependent upon certain
events. Indeed, the actual undertaking of one of the parties to a
swap or ceiling agreement often is structured and designated as a
promissory note.
Moreover, whether many of these transactions are of an
"investment" or "commercial" character is unclear. As set forth
above, their characterization as investments could result in treat-
ment and regulation as securities.20 6 Furthermore, the interest rate
agreements may be of sufficient duration to qualify as long-term
commitments, and the parties, or at least one party, most likely
will not be in the business of dealing in interest rates. Neverthe-
less, a strong argument can be made that most, if not all, interest
rate agreements are entered into for "commercial" purposes, re-
gardless of the precise designation, terms, and duration of the ac-
tual contracts. In particular, virtually all of the parties to a swap or
ceiling agreement enter into such transactions to protect against
fluctuations in interest rates that could increase their cost of doing
business. Viewed in this light, the transactions clearly have an in-
tegral relationship to the entity's commercial activities. Further-
more, because such instruments are used primarily for hedging rea-
sons, they are removed, for the most part, from the "investment"
rubric: no expectation of profit or anticipation of speculative gains
exists. To the contrary, the goal is to limit adverse consequences
caused by market fluctuations.
In any event, the characterization of swaps or ceilings as secu-
rities may not have a significant impact on the ability of financial
institutions to trade them. First, to the extent such instruments
are marketed by banks, their offer and sale very well may be ex-
empt from Securities Act registration based upon the exemption
for bank securities.20 7 Second, because of the nature of the partici-
pants in the off-exchange interest rate markets, it should be feasi-
ble in most instances to structure a transaction as a private offer-
ing, which also would eliminate the need for Securities Act
registration.20 8 This approach would preclude any general solicita-
tion of parties or product advertising. It would permit, however,
206. See supra notes 177-24 and accompanying text.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982).
208. See supra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
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the offeror to approach entities with which it has a preexisting bus-
iness relationship or about which it has sufficient information to
indicate an ability, a willingness, and a need to enter into the
transaction.
Moreover, most, if not all, of the parties with which an offeror
would be likely to seek to enter into a swap or ceiling agreement
should fall within the definition of an "accredited investor," which
explicitly encompasses banks and certain other entities. Accord-
ingly, a finding that these types of instruments constitute securi-
ties will not present a significant constraint on their trading in
most instances. 0 9 Nevertheless, this result could present a poten-
tially significant ICA issue if swap transactions constitute a sub-
stantial portion of an entity's business. Under such circumstances,
the "inadvertent investment company" problem described above
could arise regardless of whether Securities Act registration is
required.
The more difficult issue presented may be whether a swap or
ceiling rate agreement constitutes a prohibited off-exchange
futures contract subject to the CEA's prohibition on trading. On
their face, such agreements do not appear to resemble futures con-
tracts at all. Indeed, there is no delivery of any "commodity," nor
could such a delivery be made thereunder. Significantly, however,
an interest rate swap or ceiling in many respects is identical to a
futures contract on a United States Treasury bond or bill, at least
as far as the instruments' functions and effects are concerned.210
Interest rate agreements, like Treasury bond futures, protect
against fluctuations in interest rates, which could affect adversely
the value of a securities or loan portfolio or obligation. An off-ex-
change interest rate agreement simply strips away any connection
209. Nevertheless, to the extent an interest rate swap transaction is deemed to be a
security, an entity executing such a transaction on behalf of the principals could be deemed
a "broker" within the meaning of the Exchange Act, and may be subject to broker registra-
tion. See WOLFSON, supra note 95, at 1 1.01-1.04. The definition of broker includes any
person "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982). Determining broker status, therefore, may depend
upon the remaining activities of a person executing swap transactions. In any event, the
imposition of broker-dealer registration upon a person not otherwise required to register as
a broker-dealer could result in substantial additional burdens.
210. See CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, TREASURY BOND FUTURES CoNTRACTS (1985).
Although a Treasury bond futures contract provides for the purchase and sale of actual
Treasury securities, they most often are settled by liquidation and payment of offsetting
amounts. Because the value of Treasury bonds is dependent almost exclusively on fluctua-
tions in interest rates, these amounts, in essence, simply will reflect changes in interest rates
multiplied by a given principal amount, as in the case of an interest rate swap.
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to an identifiable issue of United States Treasury securities, but it
maintains the relationship between the obligation and a specified
market interest rate. Because that rate in any event may be based
upon a Treasury rate, the agreement may function very much like
a futures contract and achieve similar results. Of further interest is
the settlement of certain futures contracts, primarily those based
on indexes, through cash payments rather than commodity
delivery.
Additionally, an interest rate agreement exhibits several
futures contracts characteristics cited by the CFTC and the
courts.211 Certain terms may be standardized and agreements may
be collateralized similarly to the margining of futures contracts.
Specifically, swap agreements may include a requirement that one
party deposit collateral and maintain that collateral at a specified
level throughout the term of the agreement. This requirement even
may be pegged to existing margin levels on Treasury securities fu-
tures. The liquidated damages provision of swap agreements also
may serve the same purpose as a right to "close out" a position.
Similarly, the forward agreements on interest rates described
above arguably could be construed as commodity options, because
they are functionally similar to options on government securi-
ties. 1 The purchaser (the option holder) pays a nonrefundable
purchase price (the premium) for the right, but not the obligation,
to receive "delivery" of a commodity (in this case, a cash settle-
ment based on movements in interest rates). Under this analysis,
however, it appears more likely that these instruments would be
found to constitute securities, because options on government
securities, unlike futures on such securities, are themselves sepa-
rate securities. In that event, it would be necessary to offer such
options through a private offering, as described above, or pursuant
to another Securities Act exemption.
Nevertheless, the agreements lack many of the salient charac-
teristics of futures contracts. The instruments are customized, at
least with respect to such essential terms as quantity and payment
dates. In contrast, the terms of most futures contracts are com-
pletely standardized with the exception of price. Furthermore, al-
though the parties may be required to deposit collateral, the con-
tracts ordinarily are not margined in the same manner as futures
contracts. Specifically, the agreements may not be "marked to
211. See supra notes 10-27 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 38-66 and accompanying text.
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market" at the end of every day and "excess margin" may not be
subject to immediate release. Moreover, the liquidated damages
provisions do permit a party to escape from a position, but not
through the establishment of an offsetting position, as in futures
trading; instead, the escape occurs through the payment of a pre-
determined amount of damages. In addition, the almost exclusive
use of such instruments by entities seeking to hedge interest rate
risk in connection with commercial businesses precludes public
participation. The offering of these products to members of the
general public or other parties not using them for commercial pur-
poses likely would raise a significant CFTC problem, particularly if
the instruments are detachable and separately tradable by persons
not involved in the original party's commercial activities.213
In any event, the CFTC to date has not attempted to regulate
interest rate agreements as futures contracts, nor has it enunciated
a policy or position with respect to interest rate agreements. In
part, this lack of effort may be due to the fact that such instru-
ments largely are limited to financial institutions with interest rate
exposure and are not offered to speculators generally or individuals
in particular. In addition, the off-exchange interest rate market de-
veloped only in the late 1970s and early 1980s and grew rapidly
and dramatically to extraordinary size. As a result, the CFTC may
have concluded informally that regulation, or even a policy state-
ment or interpretation, would be unwarranted and unfeasible par-
ticularly in view of the market's institutional nature.
B. Options on Foreign Currencies
Customers seeking to protect against a currency risk, rather
than an interest rate risk, also may use options or futures-type in-
struments. An option on foreign currency provides the right, but
not the obligation, to purchase or sell for a predetermined price a
stated amount of a particular foreign currency at any point up to
an agreed upon expiration date.' The purchase of an option to
buy currency, therefore, allows a commercial entity with a commit-
ment to purchase goods or services in a foreign currency at a fixed
time in the future to "lock in" a maximum exchange rate to be
paid for the needed currency. Conversely, an entity anticipating
213. See Net Capital Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,961 (Oct. 1985).
214. See generally Markham & Gilberg, supra note 41; See also Controlling Risk
With Foreign Currency Options, EuRoMoNEY, Feb. 1985 (Special Supplement) [hereinafter
EUROMONEY SUPPLEMENT].
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receipt of a foreign currency and expecting a decline in the foreign
currency's value prior to the date of delivery may purchase an
option to sell the currency at a fixed price, or it may write an op-
tion requiring it to sell the currency upon the purchaser's exercise
of the option.
The option writer most often is a financial institution,
although many such institutions will permit their customers to
write options, which the institutions may purchase at their discre-
tion. Once a financial institution has written an option, it most
often will seek to protect against the resulting exposure by enter-
ing into an offsetting transaction with another entity or on a fu-
tures exchange, or by covering its exposure by segregating physical
currency.215
In contrast to many of the products discussed in this Article,
options on foreign currency are traded both on organized
exchanges and over the counter. 16 In the former situation, transac-
tions are executed through brokerage firms in a public auction sys-
tem, as are other exchange transactions in securities. The over-the-
counter market operates as a dealer market, with all of a particular
entity's customers entering into transactions with it on a principal
to principal basis. Negotiations between parties therefore are
direct as opposed to the more anonymous trading atmosphere of
an exchange. In addition, over-the-counter options are more likely
to be customized to the needs of the particular counterparty.
Options on foreign currencies, as noted above, represent per-
haps the most confusing aspect of SEC and CFTC jurisdiction over
financial instruments. In particular, under the Shad-Johnson
Accord and resulting amendments to the various statutes, options
on foreign currencies traded on a national securities exchange are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC, but all other options
on such currencies are within the province of the CFTC.217- As a
215. Although an option writer can hedge its risk through a multitude of methods, the
clearest and most complete means of hedging is through the purchase of an offsetting
option. See EUROMONEY SUPPLEMENT, supra note 214. Moreover, because exchange-traded
options are in standardized amounts, these instruments seldom match an over-the-counter
option written by an institution closely enough to provide an adequate hedge. As a result, an
institution ordinarily will seek to cover its short over-the-counter option position with an
offsetting long position in the off-exchange market.
216. EUROMONEY SUPPLEMENT, supra note 214.
217. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. As noted above, the regulatory status
of currency options is unique because the SEC regulates the identical instruments when
they are traded on a national securities exchange, and the CFTC regulates them when they
are traded over-the-counter or on a commodities exchange. Currently, the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, regulated by the SEC, trades currency options, while the International
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result, options on foreign currencies traded on the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange or any other SEC-regulated securities exchange
may be entered into only through a registered broker-dealer in
accordance with exchange requirements.218
The CFTC exclusively regulates options on foreign currencies
that are traded over the counter as well as options traded on con-
tract markets and exchanges located in foreign countries. e19 As dis-
cussed above, the CEA and CFTC regulations prohibit the offer
and sale of off-exchange options, subject only to a number of lim-
ited exemptions. These exemptions include "dealer options," which
are offered by a commercial processor, merchandiser, or user of the
underlying commodity, and "trade options," which are sold to a
commercial user.22 o The dealer option exemption is useless for
most entities seeking to offer options on foreign currencies, as it is
restricted to firms that were both in the business of processing or
merchandising the underlying commodity and granting options on
such commodities in 1978.221
The trade option exemption, however, does permit the offer
and sale of options on foreign currencies under certain circum-
stances. As discussed above, this provision permits granting an
option to a person who is a producer, processor, merchant, or com-
mercial user of the underlying commodity and who purchases the
option in connection with his business.2 12 2 Although foreign cur-
rency options do not fit precisely within the terms of this exemp-
tion, currency clearly is a "commodity" for CEA purposes, and an
entity engaged in international commerce and subject to currency
exposure should be construed to be a "commercial user" of cur-
rency. Based on this analysis, the CFTC staff held in an interpre-
tive letter that currency options may fall within the trade option
exemption, provided that the option meets the exemption's condi-
Monetary Market of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, regulated by the CFTC, trades cur-
rency futures and currency futures options. Many major institutions, however, trade primar-
ily or even exclusively in the off-exchange market, because those transactions are more cus-
tomized and can be effected privately.
218. See EUROMONEY SUPPLEMENT, supra note 214. Currency options traded on
national securities exchanges are registered with the SEC under a "blanket" registration
statement filed by the Options Clearing Corporation, the clearinghouse for all SEC regu-
lated exchange-traded options. See OPTIONS CLEARING CORPORATION, Characteristics and
Risks of Standardized Options, (Sept. 1985). This unique registration procedure has been
established pursuant to SEC regulation. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1 (1986).
219. See supra notes 196 and 217.
220. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 60-61; see also 17 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1986).
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tions. 223 In that instance, the staff was presented with the question
of the permissibility of sales to United States persons of options on
foreign currencies traded on an exchange outside the United
States. The staff concluded that such sales may be made provided
that the purchaser is a commercial user of the underlying commod-
ity, is subject to the risk of fluctuations related to the specific cur-
rency underlying the option purchased, and provides written repre-
sentations that the option is being purchased in connection with
its business. 224
Conversely, the grantor of a currency option may be prohib-
ited from purchasing an option on the same underlying currency to
protect itself against the risk incurred as an option writer, unless it
has separate exposure in that currency.225 The staff's concern is
that the applicability of the trade option exemption depends upon
the status of the purchaser, and allowing grantors to "bootstrap"
themselves into the status of permissible offerees would circum-
vent the options ban and allow any individual or entity to operate
essentially an off-exchange options business. Although it may be
feasible in many, if not most, instances to offset a written option
through the purchase of an option, this offset, based on the per-
son's other business activities, may not be possible if the entity's
223. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 84-7, reprinted in [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,025 (Feb. 22, 1984).
224. Id. Although the instruments at issue in those instances in fact were traded on
exchanges, the exchanges were located outside the United States. As a result, they were not
CFTC-regulated contract markets, and the CFTC has taken the position that options traded
in this manner are to be regulated in the same manner as over-the-counter options offered
and sold in the United States. In fact, in 1978 the CFTC described the term "foreign com-
modity options" to mean "options on physical commodities or on commodity futures con-
tracts which originate on or through the facilities of foreign exchanges," and has noted that
such "foreign options may be offered under the trade option exemption." 43 Fed.Reg.
16,153, 16,157 (1978).
225. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 84-7, reprinted in [1982-84 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22-025 (Feb. 22, 1984). Specifically, the CFTC staff stated
that:
only a bank which engaged in Swiss Franc currency exchange transactions in its own
behalf as part of its commercial banking activities could qualify as an exempt pur-
chaser of options on Swiss Francs under Commission Rule 32.4. In this regard, the
purchase of options on Swiss Francs would have to bear some direct, "non-speculative"
relationship to the bank's Swiss Franc currency transactions in the cash forward mar-
ket. Option purchases that exceeded any bona fide hedging requirements would be
speculative and as such inconsistent with the trade option exemption. Moreover, a
bank would be a qualified offeree only to the extent it purchased options as a principal
for its own account and could not purchase options as an agent for its depositors or
customers.
Id. at 28,595.
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only exposure is the written option.
Nevertheless, the CFTC has made it clear that the commercial
purpose for which an option is purchased need not satisfy the
"bona fide hedging" requirements of CFTC regulations. To the
contrary, provided that the transaction is entered into for legiti-
mate business purposes, it does not appear necessary that it be a
"perfect" hedge.2 6 Furthermore, the CFTC has indicated some
broadening of the permissibility of transactions in options traded
on foreign exchanges. In particular, the CFTC has proposed a reg-
ulation that would permit the offer and sale in the United States
of foreign futures or option contracts by registered entities, subject
to a number of conditions.2 In addition, in a recent release, the
CFTC extended the clearance its staff provided to the entity re-
questing the interpretive letter cited above by stating that banks
226. Id. at 28,596. The precise nature of the required relationship an option purchaser
must have with the underlying currency therefore is unclear at present. It appears, however,
that, at least in the case of a banking institution, a regular and ongoing connection with the
underlying currency will be sufficient to support the entity's right to purchase options on
the currency, regardless of whether each specific purchase is intended to hedge an identified
currency position. In this regard, the CFTC staff noted that a "bona fide hedge transac-
tion," as defined in CFTC regulations, is only one example of a permissible "non-specula-
tive" purpose. Other commercial purposes may be acceptable, thereby suggesting that actual
hedges are not required. Id. at 28,596 n.12. See also 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (1986). With respect
to non-banking entities, the permissible scope of option purchases is less clear; it seems
reasonable to conclude that these entities also should be permitted to purchase options on
currencies provided that the non-banking entities have some regular and ongoing exposure
in the underlying currency apart from their options transactions, although it is less clear
that their business is related directly to such exposure.
227. 49 Fed. Reg. 29,963 (1984); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 12,104 (1986) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. Part 33). The CFTC has requested comment on a number of proposals which
would require, among other things, that the writer as well as the purchaser of a trade option
be a commercial user of the underlying commodity. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,786 (1985). This pro-
posed requirement could serve to restrict further the availability of the trade option exemp-
tion for use in connection with off-exchange currency options transactions. Provided that
"commercial use" is not defined in such a way as to be limited to bona fide hedge transac-
tions, however, financial institutions and many large corporations should be able to utilize
this market. Significantly, the CFTC also requested comment on the need for more objective
standards in determining the status of permissible offerees. The release further suggested
that CFTC regulations regarding leverage transactions may be applied in some analogous
form of dealer options trading.
With respect to the offer and sale of foreign futures and options, the CFTC's proposal
stated that persons engaging in such activities would be required to register with the CFTC
and would be subject to a regulatory scheme similar to that imposed upon FCMs. 51 Fed.
Reg. 11,905 (1986). The CFTC also proposed separate risk disclosure requirements specifi-
cally addressing the risks associated with foreign futures and options. Id. Particularly, the
inclusion of options traded on foreign exchanges in this proposal represents a substantial
departure from the CFTC's longstanding blanket prohibition on the offering of such instru-
ments in the United States. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 41, at 767.
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in the United States may grant options on foreign currencies
traded on foreign exchanges in addition to purchasing such instru-
ments.2 28 Significantly, however, the CFTC explicitly stated that
this permissibility would not extend to financial institutions other
than banks.229
C. Forward Contracts on Foreign Currencies
Apart from the trading of options on foreign currencies, many
financial institutions, including most major banking organizations,
participate in what is referred to broadly as the "interbank cur-
rency market," a loosely defined network of banks and dealers
trading in foreign currencies literally around the clock in all parts
of the world.2 30 Transactions in the interbank market principally
include "spot" purchases and sales of foreign currency, for immedi-
ate delivery; "swap transactions"; and forward transactions provid-
ing for delivery at a later date. These swap transactions are func-
tionally similar to the interest rate swaps described above, but
they operate in much the same manner as currency forwards. In
contrast to options on currencies, however, a spot or forward con-
tract requires the parties to undertake performance and does not
provide for one party's election.23 1
Customers ordinarily enter into forward contracts in curren-
cies based on units of the applicable currency, with customers
required to pay the full purchase price upon settlement unless the
position is closed out before that time. Customers usually are
228. 51 Fed. Reg. 12,698 (1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Part 32). The problem
cited earlier by the CFTC in connection with the granting of options traded on foreign
exchanges is that, by the very nature of exchange trading, the grantor cannot know who the
purchaser of the instrument is and, therefore, cannot be assured that the purchaser is a
commercial user of the underlying currency. Apparently reasoning that banks are suffi-
ciently engaged in currency transactions in connection with their regular business to permit
this type of trading activity, the CFTC has relaxed the restriction in connection with banks.
Nevertheless, the CFTC has stated that granting options traded on foreign exchanges is
permissible only when the transactions are for hedging purposes as defined under the rules
of the relevant exchange and when the CFTC has access to information regarding the trans-
action and the identities of the parties.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1974); CFTC v. American
Board of Trade, 479 F.Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); CFTC v. Sterling Capital Company
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,169 (N.D. Ga. 1981); City Bar
Report, supra note 18.
231. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEw YORK, RESULTS OF U.S. FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MARKET TURNOVER SURVEY CONDUCTED IN APRIL 1983; FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW
YORK, RECENT TRENDS IN THE U.S. FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET, Quarterly Report at 38-46
(1984).
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charged commissions or markups that are calculated as a percent-
age of the United States dollar value of the transaction on a per-
transaction basis. Forward transactions in currencies-often re-
ferred to as "FX" or "Forex" transactions-are executed through a
customer's account with a bank acting as a dealer and market
maker in the particular currency involved. Alternatively, the cus-
tomer may deal with an intermediary, such as a brokerage firm,
which in turn will place the transaction with a bank. 2
Entities acting as dealers in the interbank market ordinarily
are willing to deal with their largest customers on an unsecured
basis, premised upon a long-standing business relationship with
those customers and a thorough knowledge of their financial condi-
tion. Smaller or lesser known counterparties, however, may be
required to deposit collateral in cash or securities to secure their
exposure under a forward contract. This collateral ordinarily will
be established as a percentage of the value of the customer's posi-
tion, and additional collateral may be required, or excess collateral
made available to the customer, as the value fluctuates. 33
Some institutions will permit their customers to close out posi-
tions by entering into an offsetting obligation. For example, in the
case of a forward contract to purchase currency, an institution will
permit the customer to enter into a contract to sell an equivalent
amount of the same currency on the same future date. This con-
tract to sell will then extinguish the customer's commitment and
only the differences will be settled on a net basis. In some
instances, however, the institution may require the customer to
maintain both sides of the offsetting transaction as open positions
until maturity. 84
Currency forwards may be used either for hedging or for spec-
ulative purposes. For example, a United States entity selling goods
abroad and anticipating payment in a foreign currency may wish to
assure that the exchange rate will not move against it prior to the
time of payment. Therefore, the United States entity may enter
into a forward contract to sell the quantity of currency it is to
receive for a stated amount of United States dollars. Such instru-
ments, however, also may be used for speculative trading by enti-
ties or individuals seeking to profit from an expected rise or de-
cline in the value of the dollar or other currencies.
232. See supra note 231; see also Shirreff, Swaps-The Way Into Any Market,
EUROMONEY, Nov. 1983, at 60-75.
233. Shirreff, supra note 232.
234. Id.
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A currency swap, though similar to an interest rate swap or
forward currency transaction in some respects, is slightly more
complex. This transaction involves an exchange of debt into an-
other currency until maturity, when repayment is made in the
original currency, often at a previously agreed upon exchange rate.
Unlike an interest rate swap, a currency swap does not involve only
a literal exchange of currency-which would constitute merely a
spot transaction in foreign currencies-but rather involves a longer
term protection against currency fluctuations for those parties with
obligations expressed in different currencies. Accordingly, when
the parties to a currency swap are exchanging equivalent amounts
of different currencies, a formula is used to account for the differ-
entials in interest and exchange rates over the term of the swap.
For example, a party with a good credit rating in United States
dollars, but with limited access to the Swiss franc market, might
agree to swap fixed rate dollars for fixed rate Swiss francs in order
to benefit from relatively low Swiss franc interest rates. Another
party enters into the agreement to obtain cheap United States dol-
lars that the first party can provide through its favorable credit
rating.235
Because of the involvement of both exchange rates and inter-
est rates in the context of a currency swap, these transactions are
somewhat more complex than interest rate swaps, although the
mechanics of the two are virtually identical. Currency swaps also
are generally settled on a "net" basis in one or the other of the
currencies involved, rather than by requiring actual payment in
both currencies by the parties. In addition, a bank or other inter-
mediary often is interposed between the two principals to the
transactions for the same reasons noted above in connection with
swap agreements. 3 6
Because currencies themselves are not securities under the
definitions set forth in the federal securities laws, forward con-
tracts to purchase and sell currencies generally should not them-
selves be deemed securities. The principal regulatory problem aris-
ing from such instruments, however, is the CEA's ban on off-
exchange transactions in futures contracts. As noted above, the
Treasury Amendment to the CEA states that the statute does not
apply to transactions in foreign currencies, unless conducted on a
235. Id. at 61.
236. See id. at 60-75.
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board of trade.237 On its face, therefore, the CEA leaves all
purchases and sales of foreign currencies, whether for future or im-
mediate delivery, outside its scope.
Nevertheless, the CFTC has stated that an informal network
of brokers and dealers may be deemed to be a "board of trade,"
even when not formally organized as an exchange. 38 Moreover,
based upon the Treasury Amendment's legislative history, the
CFTC has stated that the exclusion of currency transactions from
the prohibition on off-exchange futures trading applies only when
such transactions are entered into by "sophisticated and informed
institutions" and not when trading involves members of the gen-
eral public.28 9 The CFTC's reasoning appears to be that Congress
intended in constructing the Treasury Amendment only to pre-
clude the CFTC from exercising regulatory jurisdiction over cur-
rency trading between banks or other large financial institutions.
When currency products are marketed to smaller individual trad-
ers, speculators, or others, however, the CFTC asserts that it can
and must regulate the trading if it involves futures contracts.4 °
Accordingly, the CFTC's Office of General Counsel issued an
interpretive release in 1985 which stated that off-exchange futures
transactions in foreign currencies are within the terms of the Trea-
sury Amendment-and therefore outside its jurisdiction-only
when entered into by "sophisticated and informed institutions. ' 241
The release explicitly stated that it was not intended to apply to
legitimate forward contracts in currencies, when the parties gener-
237. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
238. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 77-12, reprinted in [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH), 1 20,467, at 21,909 (Aug. 17, 1977). In that instance, the CFTC
staff addressed the applicability of the Treasury Amendment to off-exchange trading of for-
ward contracts on GNMA pass-through certificates. The staff noted that the term "board of
trade" need not be limited to organized futures exchanges, but could include informal net-
works of dealers, where, among other things, transactions and products are marketed to
members of the general public. The emphasis the CFTC and its staff places on the general
public's involvement appears to be based upon a fundamental belief that the CEA, the
CFTC, and the entire regulatory structure is designed in large part to direct public trading
of futures-type instruments onto organized exchanges that provide protections not afforded
to participants in many off-exchange trading arrangements. See Letter of Thomas R. Dono-
van, President of the Chicago Board of Trade, to CFTC Office of Secreteriat (Dec. 23, 1985)
(regarding CFTC Statutory Interpretation and Request for Comment, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983
(1985)). As a result, when marketing programs involve members of the general public, the
CFTC is likely to find that the trading has been conducted on a "board of trade," whether
organized or not, and that a violation of the CEA has occurred.
239. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983, 42,986 (1985).
240. Id.
241. Id.
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ally intend to make and receive delivery of the subject currencies
and delivery in fact occurs in the overwhelming majority of in-
stances.242 The release instantly created an uproar among broker-
age firms, banks, and other financial institutions that regularly
enter into currency transactions with their customers. These enti-
ties expressed the strong concern that the CFTC's position would
prevent them from conducting many of their legitimate business
operations with customers who, while having substantial wealth
and sophistication, might not be deemed to be "institutions"
within the CFTC's definition." 3
The CFTC received a number of comments from these parties
in response to the release. In general, the comments espoused the
following arguments: (1) the plain meaning of the Treasury
Amendment is that Congress intended to preclude CFTC jurisdic-
tion over all off-exchange transactions in foreign currencies, re-
gardless of the parties involved; (2) as a practical matter, CFTC
jurisdiction over the multi-billion dollar interbank market is im-
practical, unfeasible, and disruptive to an efficiently functioning
system; (3) any attempt to identify those entities qualifying as "in-
stitutions" necessarily is arbitrary and unworkable; and (4) the en-
tities engaging in currency trading already are regulated suffi-
ciently by the CFTC or appropriate banking authorities. 4 In
addition, the comments urged that, to the extent some regulatory
oversight is necessary, this regulation could be accomplished in
much less disruptive ways. For example, the CFTC simply could
require registration of currently unregistered entities selling for-
eign exchange products, institute disclosure requirements, or adopt
other criteria under which products could be marketed legally.245
Furthermore, several commentors argued that individuals al-
ways have played a role in currency transactions. The CFTC's at-
tempt to limit its involvement on the basis of the Treasury
Amendment, therefore, was unsupported by history or precedent.
As a result, these commentors argued that a "sophisticated inves-
242. Id. at 42,985.
243. See Letters filed with CFTC Office of Secretariat in Response to CFTC Statutory
Interpretation and Request for Comment, supra note 239. The General Counsel of the
CFTC, Kenneth M. Raisler, also held a series of meetings with industry representatives in
New York and Chicago to review the CFTC's position and to discuss its possible courses of
action. See Mitchell, The Treasury Amendment & Foreign Currency Forward Transac-
tions, COMMODITiES L. LMErER (Dec. 1985); Yeres and Bruckner, Regulator Wants Currency
Transaction Power, AMERICAN BANKER (Jan. 1986).
244. See supra note 243.
245. Id.
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tor" test similar to the test under SEC Regulation D should be
extended to interbank trading.2 46 The CFTC acknowledged infor-
mally, largely on the basis of a comment letter submitted by Mer-
rill Lynch International Bank and Merrill Lynch Futures Inc., that
individuals in fact had traditionally participated in the interbank
market for many years and had done so at the time that Congress
enacted the Treasury Amendment. 47
The most significant comment in response to the release, how-
ever, was a letter from the Treasury Department stating that the
Treasury Amendment is a "transactional exemption" not confined
to purchases and sales among "sophisticated and informed institu-
tions" and that the statute itself places no limitations on the cov-
erage of the exemption. 24 Because the Treasury Amendment was
included in the CEA at the Treasury Department's insistence, its
views are entitled to great weight, and the CFTC, although it has
issued no further public pronouncements on the subject, has indi-
cated informally that it may rethink its entire position and per-
haps depart from the interpretation set forth in the release.24 9
Despite the unequivocal terms of the Treasury Amendment it-
self, the legislative history is at best unclear. The CFTC's position
that the exemption is limited to transactions entered into by so-
246. See, e.g., Comment Letter filed by Merrill Lynch Futures Inc. and Merrill Lynch
International Bank with the CFTC Office of the Secretariat (Dec. 23, 1985).
247. See Futures Industry Association, CFTC Report, Apr. 14, 1986, at 3.
248. Letter of Charles 0. Sethness, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Trea-
sury, to Susan M. Phillips, Chairman of the CFTC (May 5, 1986). In particular, the Trea-
sury letter stated that:
By its terms, the Treasury Amendment exemption is a transactional one that places
outside the coverage of [the CEA] all off-exchange futures transactions in the listed
financial instruments. In its interpretative statement, [CFTC] would limit the exemp-
tion to transactions between sophisticated and informed institutions. However, the
Treasury Amendment itself contains no language limiting the coverage of the exemp-
tion based upon the characteristics of participants in a transaction.
Id. The Treasury noted that "it may be appropriate to bring some foreign currency futures
transactions marketed to the general public off-exchange within the scope of the Commod-
ity Exchange Act," but stated that Congress should make such a determination.
The Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency also submitted com-
ments. See Letter of Michael Bradfield, General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Board, to
Kenneth M. Raisler, General Counsel of the CFTC (Mar. 5, 1986); Letter of Owen Carney,
Director, Investment Securities Division, Comptroller of the Currency, to CFTC Office of
the Secretariat (Apr. 11, 1986). The Federal Reserve Board argued essentially that transac-
tions of one million dollars or more should be deemed to be within the Treasury Amend-
ment and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the CFTC, and that a subjective test, based
on a customer's status and sophistication, should be applied to determine the permissibility
of smaller transactions.
249. See CFTC Staff Goes Back to Drawing Board on Treasury Interpretation, SEC.
WEEK, at 10-11 (May 19, 1986).
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phisticated and informed institutions is supportable. Nevertheless,
this position does not necessarily warrant exclusion of all individu-
als from the market. Rather, even if the CFTC wishes to retain its
interpretation of the Treasury Amendment, it should simply recog-
nize that many individuals operate in a similar manner to institu-
tions when entering into interbank transactions and have done so
since before 1974, the date of the Treasury Amendment's enact-
ment. This recognition would permit the CFTC's regulations to ar-
ticulate the types of individuals the CFTC believes are within the
Treasury Amendment's terms. An "accredited investor" standard,
which would be consistent with the CFTC's long-standing position
on the matter, would be appropriate.
D. Commodity-Backed Bonds
In recent years a number of mining companies and other enti-
ties have begun to offer bonds backed in one form or another by
physical commodities. For example, in 1980 the Sunshine Mining
Company offered the public what it described as silver-indexed
bonds.25' These bonds, which were sold as securities registered
with the SEC under the Securities Act, were redeemable at an
"index principal amount," which was the greater of one thousand
dollars or the market value of fifty ounces of silver for each one
thousand dollars face amount of the bond. If the index principal
amount was greater than one thousand dollars, the company could
deliver, in lieu of that amount, fifty ounces of silver for each one
thousand dollars face amount of outstanding bonds. 5 1 In effect,
this feature operated as a "sweetener" for purchasers of the bond
and permitted investors to receive the benefits of increases in the
value of silver the company owned without being subject to a re-
duction in the investment's value if silver prices should fall.
Similarly, in 1981 the American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
announced a proposal to trade put and call options on "bullion
250. SUNSHINE MINING Co. PROSPECTUS (Apr. 19, 1980). The Sunshine Mining Com-
pany at the time operated the largest silver mine in the United States. The Company
recently initiated an exchange offer for the bonds, offering to exchange them for securities
bearing interest at a higher rate and indexed to a greater amount of silver. Sunshine Mining
Extends Exchange Offer on Bonds, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 34.
251. SUNSHINE MINING Co., supra note 250. The prospectus stated that, as of the close
of trading on February 10, 1983, the spot settlement price of silver on the Commodity
Exchange, Inc. was $14.125 per ounce; at this price, fifty ounces of silver would have been
valued at $706.25. Thus, a $293.75 increase in the value of the silver would have been neces-
sary before the purchaser could receive any added benefit from this feature of the bond.
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value demand promissory notes" (BVNs).252 The BVN constituted
a non-interest-bearing obligation of an AMEX issuer to pay an
amount in United States currency equal to the market value of the
number of ounces of gold or silver described in the note, based
upon the London "fix" price for the particular metal on the busi-
ness day immediately following the date of demand set forth in the
note.2 53 The AMEX proposed that options on BVNs would be
traded at twenty-five dollar to four hundred fifty dollar exercise
intervals for gold and fifty cent exercise intervals for silver. The
AMEX stated that the proposal "would make it possible to shift
risks associated with bullion ownership, while at the same time
providing opportunities for investment in the trading of options on
securities whose prices would be closely related to those of gold
and silver bullion. ' 254 In effect, the AMEX proposal converted an
investment in gold or silver into a security in the form of a promis-
sory note. The proposal, however, was never effectuated. Instead,
the AMEX began to trade options directly on gold in substantially
the same manner as options on gold or silver are traded on the
Commodity Exchange, Inc. (COMEX).255
More recently, issuers have developed variations on these
products, including zero coupon bonds that provide for a minimum
return that may be increased by an amount equal to the excess in
price of a stated commodity price index at the time of maturity
over the price at the time of sale.256 This bond, which most often is
252. 46 Fed. Reg. 55,044 (1981).
253. Id. The BVN was described in the offering materials as:
[A] promissory note issued by an AMEX-approved issuer. It is a non-interest bearing
obligation of the issuer to pay an amount, in U.S. currency, equal to the market value
of the number of fine troy ounces of gold or silver bullion described in the note, based
upon the price at which the bullion is fixed at the A.M. London fixing for the particular
bullion on the business day immediately following the date of demand ....
Id.
254. Id. at 55,047.
255. 49 Fed. Reg. 43,745 (1984). See generally Gold Bullion Options Approved by
CFTC for New Amex Unit, Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1985, at 46. Pursuant to CFTC approval,
the option was traded under the CFTC's pilot program for exchange-listed options. See
supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. Interestingly, however, trading in this option is
conducted through a "board broker" system, a concept developed by the securities industry
and adopted by the CBOE for the trading of options on securities. The "board broker,"
which maintains a "book" of customer orders and performs the role of the traditional
exchange specialist in assuring an orderly market, has not been adopted in the futures his-
tory. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 41, at 15, 744-75.
256. These instruments are substantially similar to Sunshine Mining Company bonds
or BVNs, except they permit investors only to share in the value increase of specific quanti-
ties of commodities, rather than allowing customers to receive delivery of the commodities.
In addition, they normally are appended as coupons to a traditional debt offering although,
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attached as a coupon to a larger debt offering, does not permit the
holder to obtain delivery of actual commodities, but it does allow
the holder to benefit from a price rise during the term of the bond
without being subject to the risk of falling prices. Other entities
have offered bonds with detachable coupons providing the right to
receive the dollar value of a stated quantity of gold or silver on the
maturity date or to accept delivery of the actual metals. Commod-
ity-backed bonds based on oil or indexes of oil prices recently have
been introduced as well.2 57
These instruments generally are deemed securities because
they operate, for the most part, like any other bond issued by a
corporate entity. From the perspective of the securities laws, the
only distinction from standard bond financing appears to be that
the repayment obligation may be based on commodities prices,
rather than a fixed or floating interest rate.5 8 In any event, they
clearly constitute evidences of indebtedness acquired for invest-
ment purposes. As a result, their issuance and sale in most cases
must be made through a Securities Act registration or a private
placement, unless another exemption is available. Because the in-
struments most often are sold in smaller denominations to many
nonaccredited investors, the private offering exemption may not be
available. Accordingly, with the exception of transactions that can
be placed with a small number of institutions, the majority of
these bonds are sold through registered Securities Act offerings. 59
Under the CEA, however, a commodity-backed bond may be
deemed to be either a futures contract or an option, depending
upon its structure. 26 0 For example, a bond providing the right, but
not the obligation, to receive delivery of a stated quantity of met-
als up to or on a fixed date in the future strongly resembles a stan-
dard commodity option on gold or silver. In return for a fee (a
as discussed below, they may be detachable and separately traded.
257. See Standard Oil Sells New Issue Linked to Price of Crude, Wall St. J., June 23,
1986, at 30; Dutt, Commodity-Linked Bonds Under Regulator's Scrutiny, INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIG., at 14 (July 28, 1986); NRM ENERGY Co. PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS (July 17,
1986).
258. This distinction, however, as discussed more fully below, is significant for pur-
poses of the commodities laws. In particular, an obligation to make payments based upon
fluctuations in the prices of commodities, or an obligation to deliver physical commodities,
in many instances will be deemed to involve the offer and sale of an off-exchange futures
contract or a commodity option.
259. See CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, Interpretative Letter No. 85-7 re-
printed in [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 22,727 (Mar. 6, 1985).
260. For a discussion of the nature and definition of futures contracts, see supra notes
10-37 and accompanying text.
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portion of the purchase price of the bond), the purchaser is
granted the right, but not the obligation, to receive delivery of a
stated quantity of metals. In contrast to a standard commodity op-
tion, the terms of these bonds most often will not require the pur-
chaser to pay any additional amount for the metals. Arguably,
however, the "strike price" and the "premium" simply have been
collapsed into the purchase price of the bond.
Similarly, a bond that requires the purchaser to accept and
the issuer to deliver a stated quantity of metals or its cash
equivalent at a stated time in the future essentially operates like a
futures contract. Although no margin payments are involved, the
terms of the contract are standardized, and the instrument may be
used to speculate in metals prices. In fact, this latter point proba-
bly is the strongest argument in favor of regarding these instru-
ments as options or futures contracts under the CFTC's most
recent analysis, which, as noted, has relied primarily on whether
delivery is intended and actually occurs in most cases. When no
delivery is intended or occurs, the product very well may be viewed
as an opportunity for price hedging or speculation, and therefore
as a substitute for exchange-traded futures contracts or options.
Based largely upon this line of reasoning, in 1982 the CFTC's
Division of Trading and Markets issued an interpretive letter stat-
ing that so-called "commodity certificates" were likely to be
deemed prohibited futures contracts or options if offered and
sold.26' In that instance, a company proposed to issue certificates
providing purchasers with the right to a cash settlement equal to
the price difference of a stated quantity of a given commodity or
commodities between the time of purchase and settlement. 2 2 The
261. CFTC Division Trading of Markets, No-Action Letter (Aug. 10, 1982).
262. Id. The offering circular represented that the commodity certificates would be
issued under the following terms and conditions:
Certificates shall be issued for those months of expiration that the Company shall
deem appropriate, shall typically be of 60-180 days duration at issuance, and shall
expire at midnight on the first day of the month of expiration. . . . At any time prior
to expiration the Holder may require the Company to redeem each $1,000 Certificate
redeemed for cash equal to the 'Prevailing Price' of one 'Commodity Unit' . . . . At
expiration the Holder shall receive for each $1,000 Certificate redeemed cash for equal
to the 'Prevailing Price' of one 'Commodity Unit' or $1,000 whichever is greater. A
'Commodity Unit' shall be determined at issuance as a specified quantity of the under-
lying commodity and shall be based on such factors as, but not limited to, the price
volatility of the underlying commodity, the duration of the Certificate, interest rates,
and the demand for the Certificates . . . . The 'Prevailing Price' of the underlying
commodity shall be defined as the average settlement price of the three trading days
immediately prior to the date of redemption of the futures contract for the month
corresponding to the month of the Certificate's expiration on the appropriate exchange
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Division of Trading and Markets concluded that the offering of
such instruments would violate the CEA because they could not be
used for purchase, sale, and delivery of physical commodities, but
only for purposes of price speculation.83 Although the CFTC did
not analyze the salient characteristics of futures contracts and op-
tions described above, it regarded this feature as significant enough
in itself to warrant prohibition.
Significantly, however, the requesting entity in that instance
was not engaged in a business involving the commodities underly-
ing the certificates to be sold. Under such circumstances, the in-
strument does appear much more like a speculative vehicle. In con-
trast, when an entity such as a mining company offers bonds based
upon the value of metals it owns, mines, processes, or otherwise
handles in connection with its business, a strong argument can be
made that the purchase of the bond is really an investment in the
issuer itself, because the issuer's profit or loss likely will fluctuate
with the commodities' value. In such a case, fewer speculative ele-
ments are present. Moreover, many of these instruments include
the commodity-based portion of the repayment obligation as a
nondetachable aspect of a larger investment in the entity. As a re-
sult, it is less likely that this portion will be traded separately or
that a secondary market in these portions could develop. This fac-
tor also supports the argument that such portions should be
treated simply as an investment in the issuer and not as a distinct
product subject to CFTC regulation.
In a subsequent no-action letter, the CFTC's Division of Trad-
ing and Markets stated that a company engaged in the business of
acquiring, exploring, and developing precious metals mining
properties could not offer and sell securities with attached "gold
warrants," which provide the holder the right to purchase a fixed
.... The Certificates do not pay interest and commodity prices will have to rise over
the investment period in order to provide a return equal to that of income producing
assets, although substantial profits may sometimes be realized .... Under no circum-
stances shall the Holder require, nor shall the Company satisfy its obligations by, the
delivery of the underlying commodity.
Id.
263. Id. Specifically, the Division of Trading and Markets stated that
because the anticipated returns to Holders of commodity certificates are referenced to
the prevailing prices of commodities trading on designated contract markets, the sales
of those Certificates appear to constitute "dealings in commodities for future delivery
that are or may be used for ... determining the price basis of any such transaction in
interstate commerce."
Id.
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amount of the company's gold at a stated price.264 The Division, in
declining to grant the no-action position, noted that the warrants
were detachable and transferable and operated in the same man-
ner as commodity options. 2 5 Shortly thereafter, the CFTC's OGC
responded to a request for a no-action letter regarding a Canadian
company operating a precious metals mining business that pro-
posed to issue "gold purchase warrants" in conjunction with an of-
fering of preferred stock. 6 The warrants granted the holders the
right to purchase a specific amount of gold at a stated price on four
separate exercise dates or to cancel the warrant during a two year
period.287 The OGC rejected the argument that the refundability of
a portion of the customer's payment negated a finding that an op-
tion had been offered, because the instrument had all the other
essential characteristics of and operated as an option.268
Recently, the CFTC's OGC has indicated an increased willing-
ness to permit the sale of debt instruments that contain "option-
like" features. For instance, the OGC has stated that it may be
permissible to offer commodity-backed bonds providing for the de-
livery of a stated quantity of metals or their cash equivalent, if the
offering is made only to non-United States persons residing outside
the United States or to United States persons provided the "exer-
264. CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, Interpretative Letter No. 85-7, reprinted
in [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 22,727 (Mar. 6, 1985). The
issuer in that instance had filed with the SEC a registration statement under the Securities
Act covering 1,300,000 units, each unit consisting of one share of common stock, one com-
mon stock purchase warrant, and one gold warrant. Exercise of the gold warrants was sub-
ject to the issuer's production of sufficient gold during each calendar quarter. The warrants
were exercisable only in increments of 0.5 troy ounces, representing fifty warrants, and the
price of those warrants would be tied to a "base production cost," which initially was estab-
lished at $300.00 per ounce but would be adjusted quarterly in proportion to increases or
decreases in the Consumer Price Index. The Offering Circular gave no assurance that the
issuer would produce any gold during the period for exercising gold warrants. The Circular
also could not assure that adequate gold would be produced to permit exercise of all
warrants.
265. Id. In particular, the Division of Trading and Markets stated that "the above-
described warrants are detachable and transferable instruments that give the Holder the
conditional right, but not the obligation, to purchase physical gold. Moreover, it appears
that part of the purchase price of the. . . offer is directly attributable to the value of the
gold warrant and thus would serve the economic purpose of a premium." Id. at 31,061-62.
266. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-4, reprinted in [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,802 (Sept. 17, 1985). The offered units consisted of one
share of preferred stock and four gold purchase warrants. The warrants and the share were
traded separately on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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cise" can occur only outside the United States.269 In addition, it
may be possible to offer a coupon providing for a minimum return
at maturity with a higher payment in the event of an increase in
commodity prices, because this payment structure is more like a
traditional bond than a commodity option.Y
The latter possibility occurred when The Standard Oil Com-
pany made an offering of notes, attached to a debenture, that were
separately tradable. Standard Oil issued the notes in denomina-
tions of one thousand dollars, with maturities of four and six years.
Upon maturity the holders would be entitled to receive in cash the
sum of (1) the principal amount of the note, plus (2) an additional
amount as a premium equal to any excess of an identified crude oil
price over twenty-five dollars, multiplied by a stated number of
barrels of crude oil. The notes also were subject to redemption
prior to maturity at the holder's option.2 71 Although the CFTC has
made no public statement on the issue and the CFTC staff report-
edly favored taking action against Standard Oil, the CFTC Com-
missioners apparently determined that the "hybrid" nature of the
instrument argued against any action. 2  In particular, the CFTC
appears to have concluded that the notes were part of a larger in-
vestment vehicle and that the investment's option-like features did
not predominate (i.e., the relative values of the "debt" and "op-
tion" elements warranted characterization of the overall product as
a debt security, rather than a commodity option).27 3 As a result,
269. See Dutt, Twist Allows U.S. Investors to Buy Unusual Deal, INVESTMENT DEAL-
ERS' DI., at 21-22 (June 9, 1986). In that instance, Quadrex Securities Corporation, a
United States broker-dealer, placed $3,000,000 of a $25,000,000 convertible debt deal on
behalf of Pegasus Gold Corporation with United States investors. The United States inves-
tors waived the right to receive actual gold bullion upon conversion. Instead, they agreed to
sell their bonds overseas, obtaining the conversion premium in cash.
270. STANDARD OIL CO. PROSPECTUS (June 16, 1986). See also Monroe, Standard Oil
Sells New Issue Linked to Price of Crude, Wall St. J., June 23, 1986, at 30.
271. See STANDARD OIL Co., supra note 270; CBT Objects to New Oil-Indexed Bond
Issues, Cites Off-Exchange Threat, Sec. Week, July 28, 1986, at 6-7; Commodity-Linked
Bonds Under Regulator's Scrutiny, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., July 28, 1986, at 14.
272. STANDARD On. Co., supra note 270; see also Monroe, supra note 271, at 30.
273. See R. Davis, Are Indexed Oil Instruments Also Commodity Options?, COMMOD-
rry L. LETrER (July-August, 1986). Robert Davis, A CFTC Commissioner, argues that the
"option-like" features of these instruments should be evaluated by ranking them on a "Con-
tinuum," based upon such factors as the value of the "premium" relative to the debt offer-
ing or the value of the indexed payment relative to the value of coupon payments. Those
investments operating more like traditional options, says Davis, perhaps should be regulated
as such and restricted to exchanges. In other instances, according to Davis, treatment such
as that accorded dealer or trade options may be warranted.
In any event, the market itself may ultimately determine the need for CFTC regulation.
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offering commodity-backed bonds appears to be permissible if (1)
the offering is registered with the SEC under the Securities Act;
(2) the transaction is structured primarily as an investment in the
issuer, rather than in the underlying commodity; and (3) the "op-
tion-like" features are not the principal aspect of the offering.
Nevertheless, the CFTC has offered no guidance about the de-
terminative factors in evaluating an investment's "option-like" fea-
tures. Moreover, the emphasis on "option-like" features and rela-
tive values of debt and option elements appears to be misplaced.
The analysis will almost certainly be complex, and perhaps incon-
clusive, and may serve only to confuse the issue. A better approach
may be for the CFTC simply to adopt the position that SEC regis-
tration satisfies public protection concerns and therefore obviates
the need for a CFTC role.
E. Derivative Instruments on Exempt Securities
Financial institutions also have offered, or have attempted to
offer, a wide variety of derivative products on exempt securities
that often exhibit characteristics of securities, futures contracts, or
other regulated investment vehicles. Among these offerings have
been proposals regarding pooled investments in portfolios of
exempt securities, including United States government securities
or municipal bonds.27 ' For example, an entity may propose to buy
a portfolio of underlying securities, deposit these with a custodian,
and issue certificates of participation representing undivided inter-
ests in the pool. The dividend or interest payments to the investors
represent each investor's pro rata share of the issuer's earned in-
come on the entire pool of securities, less fees and expenses. 275
See Sailing Rough for New Bonds Linked With Commodities, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1986,
at 22.
274. See, e.g., Buffalo Savings Bank, SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,320 (Sept. 24, 1982); Gem Savings Ass'n, SEC No-
Action Letter, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,528 (July 14,
1983); Hereth, Orr & Jones, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 77,319 (Sept. 24, 1982).
275. See supra note 274. For example, in the Buffalo Savings Bank letter, the bank
proposed to offer and sell non-transferable certificates representing participations in tax-
exempt securities issued by municipal and other governmental authorities. Each participa-
tion certificate would be related to a particular municipal security that would be identified
in the certificate and would provide the owner with an undivided interest, to the extent of
the amount stated, in such security. Similarly, in the Hereth, Orr & Jones, Inc. letter, the
request concerned the issuance and sale of a series of non-redeemable mortgage pass-
through certificates that evidenced fractional undivided interests in a pool of tax-exempt
industrial development bonds, secured primarily by first mortgages on or deeds of trust
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A more limited number of institutions offer participations in
the principal or interest components of United States Treasury
securities, transactions which involve sales of rights to interest
payments on individual securities apart from rights or interests in
the principal amount. Prominent among these instruments are
Treasury Investment Growth Receipts (TIGRs), offered by Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) and Certifi-
cates of Accrual on Treasury Securities (CATs), offered by Salo-
mon Brothers, Inc. (Salomon) .2 7 TIGRs and CATs represent own-
ership of the various component parts of United States Treasury
bonds that Merrill Lynch or Salomon has purchased. For example,
a particular series of TIGRs or CATs may provide the holder with
the right to receive payment of interest or principal due on a spe-
cific Treasury bond. The underlying bonds are purchased, placed
with a custodian, and held by the custodian until maturity pursu-
ant to a custody and agency agreement. In exchange for the bonds,
the custodian creates receipts (TIGRs or CATs) that evidence a
direct ownership interest in a portion of the underlying bonds' in-
terest payments or principal.277
TIGRs and CATs are sold in registered form only. The custo-
dian registers the certificates in the name of the investor or, if the
receipts are held in "street name," in the name of the investor's
broker. In the latter situation, the broker identifies the investor on
its own books. TIGRs and CATs are transferable and are traded
actively in secondary markets maintained by Merrill Lynch, Salo-
mon, and other institutions. Merrill Lynch and Salomon are com-
pensated for their sales of TIGRs and CATs through the spread
between the aggregate price received for such instruments from in-
conveying real property. The return on certificate holders' investments would consist of the
obligors' principal and interest payments on the tax-exempt mortgage loans. All payments
and collections on the loans, with the exception of expenses, pass through to the certificate
holders. Additionally, in a number of instances, this arrangement has been established with
respect to certificates of deposit. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Company Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,909 (Nov. 28, 1984); Man-
agement Corp. of America, SEC No-Action Letter, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 77,210 (Mar. 8, 1982); Josephthal & Company, Sec. No-Action Letter, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,116 (Nov. 25, 1974); Underwood, Neuhaus &
Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 80,156 (Sept. 6, 1974). In a 1985 decision discussed below, however, the Second Circuit
held that a brokerage firm selling bank certificates of deposit had violated the Securities Act
through the offer and sale of unregistered securities. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985).
276. Offering Circular, Treasury Investment Growth Receipts, Series 14 (July 6, 1984);
Offering Memorandum, Certificates of Accrual on Treasury Securities (Nov. 28, 1983).
277. See supra note 276.
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vestors and the cost of acquiring the underlying bonds, plus
related transaction expenses."'
TIGRs and CATs are sold in three forms: (1) serial instru-
ments, representing a direct interest in one of the semiannual
interest payments due on the underlying bonds; (2) principal in-
struments, representing ownership of the principal due on the un-
derlying bonds (principal TIGRs and CATs are offered only on
bonds not subject to redemption prior to maturity); and (3) call-
able instruments, issued in connection with a series of bonds that
are subject to maturity before redemption, representing ownership
of such bonds' principal payable at maturity and representing each
of the semiannual interest payments due on the bonds commenc-
ing on the first interest payment date following the first optional
redemption date.2
In February 1985 the United States Treasury initiated a pro-
gram designated as Separate Trading of Registered Interest and
Principal of Securities (STRIPS), which was intended to "facilitate
the stripping of Treasury securities by private market partici-
pants. 2 80 Under the STRIPS program, future interest and princi-
pal payments on certain long-term Treasury securities may be
maintained separately in the Federal Reserve Board's book-entry
system. An institution that is a member of the Federal Reserve
System may request to have eligible Treasury securities separated
into their component parts and made available for sale in such
parts, although the Treasury does not itself offer and sell the com-
ponents.281 Three types of STRIPS are available for purchase: (1)
individual coupons on a noncallable security; (2) the principal
component of a noncallable security; and (3) the block of interests
constituting the principal of a callable security and the last ten
interest payments that are contingent on such security's not being
called. e2
When purchasers obtain fractional undivided interests in a
pool of exempt securities, a separate security is almost certain to
have been created. Under the Howey analysis, each purchaser has
invested a sum of money in a "common enterprise," represented by
the securities pool.2 8  The requisite commonality most likely is sat-
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Questions and Answers on STRIPS, Dep't of the Treas., Release (Jan. 15, 1985).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 104-116 and accompanying text.
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isfied because each participant's profit or loss is completely inter-
dependent with that of other investors. In other words, each par-
ticipant receives its pro rata share of income or loss from the pool.
Moreover, the success of the venture is dependent upon the efforts
of a third party because profit or loss will be determined by the
skill of the issuer in selecting the securities to be placed into the
pool.2s8 This type of arrangement also almost certainly will be
deemed to be an "investment company" for purposes of the ICA.
The pool plainly is "primarily engaged" in the business of invest-
ing or trading in securities and, under any of the ICA tests
described above, likely would be subject to regulation as an invest-
ment company.28 5
The more difficult question arises when participants obtain
direct interests in underlying securities, rather than fractional un-
divided interests in a portfolio. Under such circumstances, the
commonality required under Howey seemingly is absent, because
each participant's investment is in one component of an individual
security, not in a group or pool of securities. The investor simply
receives whatever interest or principal payments are due from the
security's issuer. Furthermore, there would not appear to be any
dependence on the efforts of a third party because the purchaser's
income, if any, derives solely from the issuer of the underlying se-
curity, which is the United States government in the case of Trea-
sury securities.
In this regard, the SEC staff stated in one instance that a
stripping of the principal and interest components of Treasury
securities did not involve the issuance of a separate security.288 In
284. SEC v. American Bd. of Trade Inc., 751 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1984). In American Bd.
of Trade, the court found interests in pools of Treasury bills and commercial paper to con-
stitute separate securities requiring registration under the Securities Act. Id. at 537. In addi-
tion, the pool itself was deemed to be an investment company subject to registration under
the ICA. Id. at 536. The interests had been sold in denominations of as little as $1,000,
despite the availability of the Treasury bills themselves in minimum denominations of
$10,000. Investors had been given "safekeeping receipts," held by the American Board of
Trade in denominations bearing no relation to any particular customer's investment, and
upon a demand for redemption by a customer, the American Board of Trade simply paid
the customer out of its own funds. As a result, investors had no direct interest in the under-
lying securities.
285. Id. at 536. See supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text. As discussed above,
the "primarily engaged" definition of an investment company is based on a subjective analy-
sis of the entity's business and on whether it holds itself out as an investment vehicle.
Accordingly, no requirement that any particular percentage of the entity's assets be invested
in securities existed.
286. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,045 (July 22, 1981).
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that case, the offeror purchased existing securities, detached the
interest coupons from them, and sold the bond and the coupon
separately, arguing that the mere act of detaching the coupons
from the bonds did not alter the character of the underlying in-
strument and did not make the offeror anything other than a
dealer in securities.87 In addition, the Treasury's operation of the
STRIPS program lends further support to the conclusion that
stripping does not result in the creation of a separate security, be-
cause the selling institution in the case of STRIPS necessarily cre-
ates the zero-coupon instrument that is sold to investors. Indeed,
in the case of TIGRs and CATs, Merrill Lynch and Salomon are
not responsible for the delivery of the coupon, which is undertaken
by the custodian.
The separate security issue was most recently addressed by
the Second Circuit in Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc."a8 In Gary Plastic the court
found that a certificate of deposit offering was subject to the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws because the broker selected
the certificates of deposit for sale to its customers, negotiated ben-
eficial interest rates, and offered to maintain a secondary market in
the instruments. In contrast, a purchaser of TIGRs or CATs re-
ceives direct rights in an underlying security that has not been spe-
cifically structured, selected, or negotiated for sale to such pur-
chaser. Under this analysis, investors simply receive the rights
obtained by the purchaser of the underlying security, but the in-
vestors are not "investing in" the purchaser's expertise in identify-
ing investments or in negotiating beneficial rates or prices. Merrill
Lynch and Salomon are not involved in establishing or negotiating
the underlying securities' terms. Although Merrill Lynch and Salo-
mon maintain secondary markets in TIGRs and CATs, a number
of other institutions do so as well; investors, therefore, are not de-
pendent upon Merrill Lynch or Salomon for resales. This issue
currently is the subject of litigation initiated by customers of Mer-
287. Id. at 77,618.
288. 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985). In Gary Plastic, the brokerage firm selected bank
certificates of deposit from a variety of issuers; represented that it would monitor the
creditworthiness of the issuing banks on a regular basis; and offered to maintain a secondary
trading market in the certificates. The court found that customers were investing in and
relying upon the skill and expertise of the brokerage firm, because the customers' profits or
losses would be based largely upon the brokerage firm's selection of particular certificates of
deposit and its maintenance of a secondary market in those certificates of deposit. Id. at
240-41.
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rill Lynch who had purchased TIGRs.2 9
Litigation also has raised the issue of whether this type of
product results in the establishment of an investment company
under the ICA. In a series of no-action letters in the early 1980s,
the SEC staff identified three significant factors in its determina-
tion of whether a pooling arrangement involves the issuance of sep-
arate securities and the creation of an investment company under
the ICA: (1) whether participants are aware of the securities in
which investments are made prior to the time of purchase; (2)
whether the manner in which purchase payments and payments on
maturity are made present a risk of loss separate from and in addi-
tion to that presented by the underlying investment; and (3)
whether any collateral features are present, such as the making of
loans to participants to enable them to receive cash prior to matur-
ity or sale of the securities.290
Based upon its analysis of these factors, the SEC has deter-
mined that aggregating individual investors' funds to purchase
large denomination securities that otherwise might be unavailable
to the individual investors does involve the offer and sale of a se-
curity and the formation of an investment company.' In contrast,
when the beneficial owner of a participation has a direct interest in
the underlying security and the right to proceed individually and
directly against the issuer, pooling is less likely to create a separate
security.292 As noted, in the case of TIGRs and CATs no pooling of
securities or issuance of fractional undivided interests occurs; pur-
chasers receive direct interests in identified securities.
Moreover, under the ICA analysis set forth above, the sale of
TIGRs and CATs appears to be far removed from the require-
ments either of a deliberate or an "inadvertant" investment com-
pany. Because the purchasers of such instruments receive direct
interests in components of the underlying securities, there is no
289. Krome v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., No. 85-765 (S.D.N.Y. filed 1985). The case is
in the preliminary stages and no decision has yet been rendered.
290. North Carolina State Employees' Association, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(March 13, 1980); Green's Farm Agency, SEC No-Action Letter (March 15, 1980); Frascella,
Russell B., C.P.A., SEC No-Action Letter (April 18, 1980).
291. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,130 (January 24, 1975). In that in-
stance, funds of customers were going to be aggregated in order to purchase large denomina-
tion participations in larger "master note" agreements.
292. See Best Product Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 11, 1980); Prudential-
American Securities, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 80,106 (December 27, 1974); Blythe, Eastman, Dillon & Co., SEC No-Action
Letter (May 21, 1975); Bankers Trust Company, SEC No-Action Letter (July 4, 1982).
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investment in an "entity" at all, much less an entity engaged in
securities trading with the funds of participants. Purchasers of
TIGRs and CATs clearly are not investing in Merrill Lynch or Sal-
omon, because the obligor with respect to payments is the United
States Government.
As these custody, pooling, and participation arrangements
have become more common in the municipal and Treasury securi-
ties fields, the questions of whether a separate security and an in-
vestment company are created have arisen more frequently, al-
though the issues have not yet been clearly resolved.293 In any
event, these programs almost certainly do not involve CEA or
CFTC issues, unless they represent a forward delivery program in
which delivery is not intended and in fact does not regularly
occur.
2 9 4
F. Commodity Financing Programs
Most banks and many other financial institutions operate
commodity financing programs that involve secured loans to cus-
tomers for the purchase of physical commodities. In its simplest
terms, a commodity financing program involves a bank loan of
money to allow a customer to purchase a commodity, secured by
the customer's grant of a security interest to the bank in the pur-
chased commodity. The security interest may be perfected through
a Uniform Commercial Code filing with the appropriate state and
local agencies or through possession by the bank of warehouse re-
ceipts representing title to the commodities.
In such instances, the bank generally will loan a percentage of
the commodity's current market value to the customer and may
require that this percentage be maintained. As a result, the cus-
tomer will have to post additional collateral as the value of the
293. See supra note 292. See also Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc., 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985). A number of institutions also
offer options or other derivatives on exempt securities. For example, Merrill Lynch recently
initiated trading in options on mortgage-backed securities, designated as Options to
Purchase or Sell Specified Mortgage Securities (OPPOSMS). The instruments available
under the program include puts and calls on GNMA certificates, Federal National Mortgage
Association certificates, and other mortgage-backed securities. Merrill Develops
"OPPOSMS," Options on Mortgage-Backed Securities, Sec. Week, Dec. 23, 1985, at 5.
294. See, e.g., Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc., 737 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1984).
As discussed above, the Treasury Amendment to the CEA exempts agreements for the
purchase and sale of government securities and other types of financial instruments from
CFTC jurisdiction unless such contracts constitute futures contracts traded on a board of
trade. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
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existing collateral diminishes because of market fluctuations. In
addition, banks may finance customers' trading on the futures
markets by extending loans for margin commitments or deliveries.
Other types of financial institutions offer financing programs
that are not tied as clearly to actual purchases of physical com-
modities. For example, a brokerage firm or dealer may offer its cus-
tomers the opportunity to finance purchases of gold or silver, se-
cured by the purchased metals.295
In contrast to bank financing, however, sometimes neither the
brokerage firm nor the customer actually owns the underlying
metal. Instead, the brokerage firm merely may undertake a "short"
obligation to deliver the metal upon the customer's satisfaction of
the loan obligations. The customer ordinarily does not receive title
to the metals, but simply is listed on the seller's books as having
"purchased" the commodities. Moreover, the institution may
rehypothecate, pledge, or sell the metal the customer purchases to
one or more other customers during the term of the loan. Thus,
whether the customer actually has received title to physical gold or
silver, or simply has entered into a contract to buy the metals at a
later date for a price fixed in the contract with interest and carry-
ing charges imposed in between, is not quite clear. 6
Under virtually all circumstances, a commodity purchase
through a financing arrangement that requires the purchaser to
pledge the commodities as collateral will raise no issues under the
securities or commodities laws. 97 Similarly, when the purchaser
buys the commodities outright and then pledges them as collateral
for the extension of a subsequent loan, no significant issues should
be raised. In contrast, when the entity extending the financing also
295. See generally Gilberg, supra note 9; City Bar Report, supra note 18. Icfn] note
292. See also Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc.,
756 F.2d 230 certificate," for which they charge a mark-up or commission for their services.
This certificate allows the customers to take legal title to a specified quantity of gold or
silver, which is stored in a vault or depository. A certificate or similar instrument issued to
the customer setting out the type and quantity of metal purchased evidences owneship.
296. Gilberg, supra note 9; City Bar Report, supra note 18.
297. Both the SEC and the CFTC have taken the position that actual purchases of
physical gold or silver, when physical delivery of the metals or a document of title to the
purchaser occurs, are outside their jurisdiction and raise no regulatory concerns. See, e.g.,
CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985); Commodity Investment Fraud II: Hearings Before the Per-
manent Sub Comm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 199-203 (1984) (statement of John M. Fedders, then Director of the SEC
Division of Enforcement) [hereinafter Fedders' Testimony]. See also infra notes 311-317
and accompanying text.
1986] 1673
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
is the seller of the underlying commodities, and title to the com-
modities has not passed in fact, substantial issues could arise
under the CEA and state law.
In particular, some entities may agree to sell precious metals
to a customer through a financing arrangement that allows the cus-
tomer to pay a percentage of the total purchase price with delivery
scheduled some time in the future. 98 The seller, however, in fact
may not own the metals at the time of the sale and either may
hedge its commitment to the purchaser through transactions in ex-
change traded futures contracts or simply may leave itself exposed.
In addition, the purchaser may have the right to resell the metal at
any time before actually taking delivery.29 9 Under such circum-
stances, the purchase and financing agreements, in conjunction
with each other, could be construed as operating in a manner simi-
lar to futures contracts. The amounts due on the loan often are
substantially identical to margin payments, and delivery is neither
intended nor made and accepted in most instances. Alternatively,
many of these transactions exhibit the characteristics of the lever-
age contracts described above. They involve a percentage payment
of the purchase price at the outset, periodic carrying charge or fee
payments on the unpaid balance, and the seller's repurchase of the
metals, often at the purchaser's demand.
Nevertheless, if the transaction does constitute a bona fide
purchase and sale and title to the metals in some form passes to
the purchaser, the transaction should not be deemed to involve a
futures or leverage contract. In a 1985 no-action letter, the CFTC's
Office of General Counsel concluded that such a financing arrange-
ment between a bank and a metals dealer would not violate the
CEA or CFTC regulations.300 In that instance, a bank proposed to
enter into purchases and sales of precious metals with several met-
als dealers, with settlement on each transaction occurring within
two business days of the contract's date. The bank would deliver
the metals either by delivering the physical metal to the dealer or
by segregating the metal for the dealer in its vaults or in a third
party's vaults. Subsequently, in some instances the dealer would
resell the metals to its own customer, either on the basis of full
payment of the purchase price or through a financing arrangement
between the purchaser and the bank. The purchaser would receive
298. See supra note 297.
299. Id.
300. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985).
1674 [Vol. 39:1599
NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
a confirmation from the dealer indicating that ownership of the
metals had been transferred to the purchaser. The bank also was
obligated to notify the customer that it was holding metals on the
customer's behalf. Under either the full purchase or financing ap-
proaches, the purchaser would be permitted to borrow against the
metals up to a certain specified amount. 10'
The OGC first noted that the full purchase price would be
paid in all of the contemplated transactions and that ownership to
the metals in some form would be transferred within a short period
of time.3 0 2 Specifically, the dealer would pay the full purchase price
to the bank, and the dealer's customer would pay the dealer the
full purchase price either on its own or through financing extended
by the bank. In addition, either documents of title or confirmations
representing ownership would be transferred upon sale. On this
basis the OGC concluded that the transactions could not be
deemed leverage contracts because title always would pass in less
than ten years and no periodic carrying charges or fees would be
imposed."' 3
This conclusion appears to be in accord with the generally
accepted leverage contract definition. 4 First, under the CFTC's
recently adopted regulations, the financing contracts were excluded
from the definition of a leverage contract because their duration
was less than ten years. More importantly, however, no percentage
payment of the purchase price to a dealer, with the remainder
financed by that dealer, occurred. To the contrary, the dealer paid
the full purchase price. The dealer's customer financed the trans-
action through the bank, not the dealer. As a result, the transac-
tion was more like a traditional bank financing arrangement.
Moreover, title actually passed to the purchaser at the time of
settlement.
With respect to the status of these instruments as futures con-
tracts, the OGC stated that because delivery would occr-either
through transfer of documents of title or confirmation-within two
business days, the agreements "lack that element of futurity which
is an essential characteristic of a futures contract, and would, in all
material aspects, be more in the nature of spot transactions with
301. Id. In that instance the bank indicated that metals might not be segregated in all
instances, and that, in such cases, ownership of the metals by the dealer's customer would
be reflected only by book entries on the bank's and the dealer's records.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 30,856.
304. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
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delivery of and payment for the underlying commodity occurring
essentially contemporaneously with the execution of the transac-
tion." °5 The OGC also noted, however, that the agreements could
be deemed to be futures contracts if the dealer or the bank stood
ready to repurchase the metals at the prevailing market price upon
the customer's demand.3 06 That such an element would provide a
means of price speculation in the underlying metals and therefore
would operate in a manner substantially similar to futures con-
tracts apparently was the basis for this conclusion.
Finally, the OGC addressed whether the Model State Com-
modity Code, which the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA) recently had adopted as part of NASAA's
effort to prevent off-exchange commodities abuses, would apply to
the proposed transactions.0 The OGC concluded that the Model
Code also would be unlikely to prohibit the agreements because
the bank would be able to avail itself of an exemption for financial
institutions' sales of commodity contracts and delivery would be
made and accepted within two business days of the sale date in all
305. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673, at 30,856 (August 6, 1985).
306. Id. As noted above, the CEA grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over transac-
tions in futures contracts and commodity options. Nevertheless, Congress amended the CEA
in 1978, to permit the states to bring parens patriae suits in federal court under the CEA
for violations committed within their borders. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)-2 (1982). See generally
Lower, State Enforcement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1057 (1978).
Moreover, in the 1982 amendments to the CEA, Congress included an "open season" provi-
sion, which specifically provides that state criminal proceedings are not preempted by the
CEA, and that state laws in any form may be applied to off-exchange instruments. 7 U.S.C.
§ 16(e) (1982); S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982). See also Horwitz & Mark-
ham, supra note 4, at 78. As a result, the states now not only may enforce the CEA with
respect to conduct within their jurisdictions, but also may enforce state law if the activity
involves prohibited off-exchange transactions. The Model Code was promulgated pursuant
to this "open season" provision.
307. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673, at 30,857 (Aug. 6, 1985). NASAA adopted the Model Code in connec-
tion with a coordinated effort among the federal and state regulatory agencies to prevent
recurrences of the serious off-exchange precious metals trading abuses that occurred in
1983-1984. See Gilberg, supra note 9. The two most celebrated scandals, involving Bullion
Reserve of North America and The International Gold Bullion Exchange, had been perpe-
trated by persons ostensibly unregulated by any federal or state agency; and the enactment
of the Model Code was intended in part to bring these dealers within the scope of some
regulatory scheme. The Model Code essentially prohibits the offer and sale of any off-ex-
change contract for the purchase or sale of commodities, primarily for investment or specu-
lation and not for the acquisition or disposition of ownership of the underlying commodities.
Nevertheless, the Model Code exempts from this proscription offers or sales by otherwise
regulated entities. The Model Code also exempts a number of specific types of transactions.
See NASAA Model State Commodity Code, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 22,568, at 30,451 (Apr. 5, 1985).
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transactions. 08 In this regard, the OGC pointed out that the
Model Code deemed confirmations or transfers of documents of
title to constitute good delivery.30 9
The status of financing arrangements under the commodities
laws, therefore, appears relatively clear at this point. If delivery in
some acceptable form occurs within two business days (or perhaps
within some longer reasonable period of time), the CFTC is not
likely to deem the instruments futures or leverage contracts. On
the other hand, arrangements in which such delivery does not
occur creates potential for abuse, particularly when a dealer has
the right to rehypothecate metals purchased by a customer. Under
such circumstances, the same metals might be sold and actually
"delivered" to a number of different customers, thus creating the
possibility that no metals will be available if one customer requests
physical delivery or sells the metals to a third party.
With respect to the securities laws, purchases and sales of pre-
cious metals, without more, apparently do not involve the offer and
sale of a security, even if a dealer finances the transaction. The
SEC has contended, and several courts have held, that a security
may be created when a broker or dealer simply pools the funds of
several customers for trading conducted in the dealer's own name
on a discretionary basis.3 10 The pooling of several customers' funds
for discretionary trading was held in those instances to satisfy the
Howey common enterprise test because the profit or loss of each
customer was intertwined with the profit or loss of other
customers.
Conversely, in a number of no-action letters, the SEC staff has
stated that programs which brokerage firms or metals dealers oper-
ate involving purchases and sales of precious metals do not require
Securities Act registration when title to the metals actually passes
to the customer, either through physical delivery or bulk segrega-
308. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 22,673, at 30,857 (Aug. 6, 1985).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 792 (D. Minn. 1975);
SEC v. Western Pac. Gold & Silver Exch. Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 95,064 (D. Nev. January 30, 1975).
311. See supra note 310. In Jenson, the dealer was granted complete discretion over
the customers' funds and used those funds to invest in a pool of metals. Each customer's
profit or loss depends upon the success of the dealer's pooled funds investment and was
intertwined with the customers' profit or loss. The court found that the individual customer
participations constituted securities within the definition of the Securities Act. In Western
Pacific, customers never acquired title to any metals and only obtained a claim against the
firm for payments of money.
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tion. In these programs, no investment advice is provided nor dis-
cretionary trading authority accepted by the broker or dealer, and
the broker or dealer does not undertake to repurchase the metals
upon demand.3 12 In contrast to the circumstances in the cases cited
above, the SEC staff found that the economic benefits to the pur-
chasers were not derived from the seller's or a third party's mana-
gerial efforts and that the dealer's functions were no more than
ministerial and custodial.313
The SEC's most recent definitive statement on the status of
precious metals programs under the securities laws was in the tes-
timony of John M. Fedders before the Senate Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations' 1984 hearings on precious metals trad-
ing. 14 In those hearings Mr. Fedders, then Director of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement, stated that contracts for the purchase or
sale of precious metals generally would not be deemed securities if
(1) the dealer's functions merely are ministerial, such as providing
storage of the metal; (2) the services that the dealer offers are not
part of an "investment package," by which the customer simply
invests money and receives profits or losses; (3) no "buy-back"
plan or other arrangement that gives the dealer shares in the cus-
tomer's risk exists; and (4) the dealer provides no investment
advice and exercises no investment discretion over the customer's
account.3 15
Mr. Fedders further testified that financing metals transac-
tions would not in itself result in the characterization of a commer-
cial transaction as a security. To the contrary, Mr. Fedders noted
that financing metals transactions essentially is no different from
financing purchases of other commodities, which generally have
not been regarded as involving the sale of securities:
The arranging of financing for precious metals transactions would not, in
most situations, transform the sales into sales of securities. Actual sales of
commodities financed by a bank or the seller would, absent other factors,
have little to distinguish them from financed sales of houses or automobiles.
Such transactions are financed purchase transactions and not securities.3 16
312. See E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 31, 1974); Drexel
Burnham & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 2, 1975); Securities Act Release No. 5552,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,037 (Dec. 26, 1974).
313. Securities Act Release No. 5552, [1975-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,037 (Dec. 26,1974).
314. Fedders' Testimony, supra note 297.
315. Id. at 201-202.
316. Id. at 202. In a recent case, the SEC alleged that a firm had been engaged in the
offer and sale of securities in violation of the Securities Act when the firm permitted cus-
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In sum, unless other factors are involved, the purchase and sale of
precious metals, even on a financed basis, should not subject agree-
ments between a customer and a broker or dealer to Securities Act
registration.
G. Deferred Pricing Agreements
As noted, the CEA explicitly sanctions the use of forward con-
tracts that provide for delivery of physical commodities at a future
date for reasons of commercial convenience or necessity. 17
Recently, however, many agricultural entities have developed
transactions known as "forward pricing" or "deferred pricing"
agreements, which allow the purchase price of commodities that
will be delivered under a forward contract to be determined some
time after the contract date. Under one type of contract, the par-
ties might enter into an agreement that guarantees the producer
the price of a specified futures contract plus or minus an agreed
upon differential.3 18 The producer has the right to set the final
price for the commodity between the time at which the contract
was entered and a "closing date," which may be the date of deliv-
ery or in some instances even a later date. For example, the pro-
ducer may have a certain amount of time after delivery to elect
whether to receive the minimum price specified in the cash con-
tract or the higher price based upon the contract's formula.319
In other cases, the agreement may state only that the purchase
price will be the price of an identified futures contract at the time
of delivery. The purchaser then hedges its obligation through
transactions in futures contracts or through other means. At the
delivery time (which in some cases may be selected by the pro-
ducer), the price is calculated according to the contract's formula,
delivery is made, and the price is paid.3 20
In an interpretive release, the CFTC's Office of General Coun-
tomers to prepay purchases of a given quantity of gold coins at a fixed price. Because the
customer could not be assured that the offeror would be able to deliver the purchased gold if
prices increased prior to delivery, the SEC contended that the purchase was really an
investment in the entity. The Ninth Circuit rejected the SEC's argument and held that the
instruments were not securities. SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., Inc. 794 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir.
1986).
317. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985). See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying
text.
318. Characteristics Distinguishing Cash and Forward Contracts and "Trade" Options,
50 Fed. Reg. 39,656 (Sept. 30, 1985).
319. Id. at 39,660.
320. Id.
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sel has stated that these transactions do not violate the CEA's
prohibitions on futures and options trading if delivery in fact
occurs in all instances, absent crop failure or some other natural
disaster that renders the commodity unavailable.2 ' The OGC
stated in that release that these transactions fall within the "for-
ward contract" exemption to the off-exchange futures contracts
prohibition because they occur only in commercial contexts; deliv-
ery is intended and in fact virtually always occurs, and if delivery
is delayed, it is delayed solely on the basis of the parties' commer-
cial needs. Moreover, the OGC stated that the contracts ordinarily
are not standardized and involve no margin or other payments.2
The OGC also stated that such agreements would not run
afoul of the CEA's options ban, despite the option-type elements
with respect to price.2 3 In the OGC's view, the principal factor is
that the transactions do not include an option on delivery. To the
contrary, each party's delivery obligation is fixed and cannot be
permitted to lapse. Delivery therefore will occur in all instances,
except when the commodities being purchased have been de-
stroyed by natural causes.2 4
The more difficult case, however, may be when a third party,
not party to the delivery obligation, provides the price protection
available under a deferred or forward pricing agreement. In this
arrangement, another agricultural entity, a brokerage firm, or simi-
lar party agrees to pay or receive from the purchaser or seller the
difference between a stated price and a formula price that ordina-
rily is based upon an identified futures contract. The third party
then hedges its own obligations through the trading of futures, op-
tions, or some combination of the two. These transactions could be
structured in a number of ways. The purchaser could offer the
seller a minimum price guarantee like those described above and
enter into an offsetting transaction with a third party that would
require the third party to make payments to the purchaser in
amounts roughly equal to those the purchaser must make to the
seller. These contracts arguably do not fall within the OGC's inter-
pretive release because the third party making or receiving pay-
ments is not making or receiving delivery of physical commodities.
321. Id. The release primarily addressed the applicability of the "trade option"
exemption, discussed above, to "hybrid" contracts, which combine elements of futures, for-
wards, and options.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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The better argument, however, appears to be that the transac-
tion still is a bona fide forward contract because delivery will occur
in virtually all instances, with a third party facilitating the transac-
tion through a price protection mechanism. Indeed, the terms of
such contracts are unlikely in any event to be standardized, and
rarely, if ever, will margin payments be involved, although there
may be a one-time fee paid up front that clearly is analogous to an
option premium. Further, provided that the party "purchasing"
the protection is not permitted to settle the contract through offset
or liquidation, the contract does not provide a vehicle for price
speculation apart from actual delivery commitments.
In fact, in one instance the CFTC's OGC stated that an insur-
ance company offering price protection to farmers it insured did
not violate the CEA's prohibitions on off-exchange futures and
options contracts 25 The company stated that the offered contracts
would permit a farmer to select a "guaranteed price" for the sale of
its crops at a future date.32 6 In return for the company's undertak-
ing to pay the farmer at the time of sale the difference between the
price actually received and the guaranteed price, the farmer would
pay a premium.32 7 The OGC concluded that it would not recom-
mend enforcement action against the insurance company if the
company submitted to all applicable state insurance regulatory
requirements and the product was offered only to existing
insurance customers.3 28
In a subsequent no-action letter, OGC concluded that a hedg-
325. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 86-1, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,920 (May 20, 1985).
326. Id. Specifically, the no-action letter described the program as follows:
At planting time, the farmer would select a guaranteed price per bushel from among
the price guarantee levels offered by [the company]. You state that the "highest price
guarantee level will be similar to the price the farmer could obtain from the local eleva-
tor" if the farmer were to enter into a forward contract for delivery of the crop at
harvest time. The farmer would also elect whether to insure 50, 75 or 90 per cent of
either the "crop yield level" which is derived from the "base yield" established for the
farmer's location or of the farmer's average actual production history filed with the
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
Id.
327. Id. The premium was determined by multiplying four factors: (1) The percentage
of the crop covered; (2) the number of acres insured; (3) the premium rate per bushel; and
(4) the farmer's share or interest in the crop. In addition, the premium included the com-
pany's hedging costs, operating and administrative costs, profit margins, premium taxes,
and commissions to insurance agents.
328. Id. The company also represented that it intended to apply to the state insurance
authorities to offer and sell the price protection insurance.
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ing service operated by an export trading company would not
result in a violation of the CEA's ban on the offer and sale of off-
exchange futures and options.32 9 The export trading company pro-
posed to extend lines of credit to foreign commercial entities in
order to finance their purchases and sales of physical commodities.
Furthermore, the lines of credit would enable the export trading
company to enter into forward contracts with such entities and to
assure them of a purchase or sale price fixed in their home cur-
rency.330 By doing so, the export trading company would thereby
protect the other party against the risks of both currency and price
fluctuation. The export trading company proposed to cover its own
exposure under such contracts through the purchase and sale of
exchange traded futures and options.3 '
In granting the request for a no-action position, the OGC
noted that the service would be available only to commercial enti-
ties and not to members of the general public and that it would be
offered only if the Federal Reserve Board approved. 2 In addition,
the letter requesting a no-action position had represented that a
majority of the transactions (approximately seventy-five percent)
would involve either contracts on commodities with respect to
which no futures contracts are traded or contracts on commodities
slightly different from the commodities on which exchange traded
futures contracts are available. 333
In each of these contexts, therefore, the OGC expressly per-
mitted a third party with no connection to the underlying transac-
tion in physical commodities to provide price protection on behalf
of another party. In each case the OGC apparently relied primarily
on the fact that the offering entity was subject to regulation by
another regulatory authority (insurance regulators in the first
instance, the Federal Reserve Board in the second) and that trans-
actions would not be available to members of the general public.
329. CFTC Office of General Counsel, No-Action Letter No. 86-5, 2 Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 23,227 (June 17, 1986).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. Shortly after the OGC's issuance of the no-action letter, the Chicago Board of
Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange took the unprecedented action of filing a peti-
tion with the CFTC to have the no-action letter revoked, on the ground that the letter
exceeded the CFTC's authority and that the CEA mandates that futures trading be con-
ducted on exchanges. In the Matter of the June 17, 1986 OGC No-Action Letter, Chicago
Board of Trade and Chicago Mercantile Exchange's Petition for Suspension and Revoca-
tion, August 4, 1986.
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Significantly, the OGC in so doing relegated the instrument's
nature to secondary importance and relied more heavily on the sta-
tus of the offeror and purchaser. Whether these precedents indi-
cate a movement away from the traditional Stovall analysis of fi-
nancial instruments toward a greater permissiveness, at least in the
commercial context, remains to be seen.
In any event, however, the nature of the instruments offered
in these two instances, when viewed apart from the parties to and
purposes of the transaction, clearly bears some similarity to an
exchange traded futures contract or option. The contracts them-
selves may not result in actual delivery between the two con-
tracting parties (although one party ordinarily makes or receives
delivery to or from another counterparty under a separate con-
tract), and they may be traded on the basis of margin, premiums,
or similar types of deposits. Nevertheless, the contracts' terms are
not standardized, but are customized to the particular needs of the
counterparty. The pricing and collateralization of the instruments
often operate distinctly from futures margins or options premiums.
Moreover, the transactions are almost always available only to
commercial entities utilizing the instruments in connection with
their trade or business. As a result, little or no opportunity for
speculation exists. Under such circumstances, the OGC's conclu-
sion is supportable under the Stovall test as well.
Indeed, these price protection agreements are virtually identi-
cal to the interest rate ceiling programs described above, distin-
guished only by the substitution of agricultural commodities for
interest rates. As noted, in that context the CFTC has taken
largely a "hands off" policy, apparently based upon its belief that
such transactions occur exclusively between financial institutions.
These entities as well as the underlying "commodity"-interest
rates-are subject to other authorities' regulatory jurisdiction.
With respect to agricultural commodities, this rationale is not
accurate. Nevertheless, for the same reasons that parties with in-
terest rate risks enter into ceiling agreements, only institutional
participants, such as agricultural business concerns, will enter into
these price protection programs in the agricultural area. In either
case, there are few, if any, legal or policy justifications for an asser-
tion of CFTC jurisdiction.
Finally, deferred pricing agreements or price protection plans
raise the same issues under the securities laws as the interest rate
products discussed above. In these cases as well, it is unlikely that
a Howey common enterprise will be found. The offeror's obliga-
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tions very well may be structured in the form of a note or evidence
of indebtedness, although a strong argument can be made that the
commercial purpose test will almost always be met, given the insti-
tutional nature of the participants and their reasons for entering
into the transactions. If not, it would be permissible to offer the
product only pursuant to a Securities Act registration statement or
an appropriate exemption from registration. When offers are made
only to commercial entities using the contracts in connection with
their trade or business, it is likely that many, or even most, offer-
ees will satisfy the "accredited investor" test under SEC Regula-
tion D. Nevertheless, many potential purchasers of such products
very well may be small enterprises or even individuals, and a pri-
vate placement approach itself may be difficult. As a result, it is
possible that a firm seeking to offer such instruments will be
required to limit its potential customer base to those individuals or
entities who are accredited investors.
Once again, however, a finding that a particular type of instru-
ment is a security could create problems under the ICA even if
Securities Act registration is not required. Specifically, an entity
deriving a substantial portion of its income from such instruments
could cross the threshold into the "inadvertent investment com-
pany" rubric described above. This result could have serious conse-
quences for the entity's ability to operate, regardless of whether
the individual securities offered to customers are required to be
registered under the Securities Act.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Perhaps the only clear conclusion from the foregoing is that
few if any coherent guidelines exist for analyzing new financial
instruments. Nevertheless, several common threads run through
the agencies' analyses of these instruments. First, and perhaps
foremost, the SEC, under Regulation D and the Securities Act, and
the CFTC, under its long-standing interpretation of the CEA, seem
less likely to challenge the offer and sale of a product that is mar-
keted solely to institutions and not to members of the general pub-
lic. The principal statutory mandate of each agency is public pro-
tection, and each agency views its primary function as reducing the
potential for defrauding public customers. Although fraud can and
does occur on organized exchanges, the SEC and CFTC are partic-
ularly sensitive to activities occurring in the over-the-counter mar-
kets, which are not subject to the same extensive regulatory and
self-regulatory oversight as exchange environments. Off-exchange
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transactions with members of the general public, therefore, almost
certainly will invoke SEC or CFTC scrutiny if they arguably
involve futures, options, or securities.
Second, the SEC and CFTC each view certain types of instru-
ments as peculiarly within or outside their respective jurisdictions,
depending upon the nature of the underlying commodity or secur-
ity. For example, a contract for the purchase or sale of a security
or index of securities, including exempt securities, undoubtedly
will concern the SEC to a greater extent than will agreements
regarding crops or livestock. This concern exists because the for-
mer contracts arguably affect the markets in the underlying securi-
ties, which are principally regulated by the SEC, while the latter
contracts will have little or no impact on those markets. In the case
of forward contracts on agricultural commodities or commodity-
backed bonds, therefore, the SEC's interest will be limited to
determining whether the product itself is a security and will not
extend to any potential repercussions on related markets.
Conversely, the CFTC is less likely to express concern over
contracts relating to interest rates or government securities than
those involving agricultural commodities. This position stems from
the CFTC's historical roots as a regulator of contracts only on such
commodities and from the Treasury Amendment; indeed, the
Commodity Exchange Authority, the predecessor agency to the
CFTC, was a division of the Department of Agriculture. Because
the growth of financial futures still is a relatively recent phenome-
non, the CFTC has not yet begun to view such instruments as
lying at the core of its regulatory mandate, despite the dramatic
growth of these markets and their present magnitude. This pos-
ture, however, is somewhat in conflict with the CFTC's long-stand-
ing position, discussed above in connection with the SEC-CFTC
jurisdictional conflict and the 1978 and 1982 legislation, that it is
the nature of the derivative instrument, not the underlying good or
right, that determines jurisdiction.
Third, both the SEC and CFTC appear more likely to find
that a given instrument is within their jurisdiction if, under a func-
tional analysis, the instrument operates in the same manner as a
security, futures contract, or option and is marketed as an invest-
ment or a vehicle for price speculation. For instance, when a par-
ticular transaction exhibits certain elements of a security and is
entered into for investment purposes, the SEC very well may con-
clude that the transaction is subject to Securities Act registra-
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tion.33 4 Similarly, a forward delivery-type contract that serves the
economic purpose of an exchange traded futures contract-it may
be used to hedge or speculate against commodity prices-makes
CFTC action more likely.
In part, this response appears to be based upon the complexity
of many of the instruments being offered today and the defini-
tional ambiguities in the law. Under such circumstances, the agen-
cies may find it necessary to look to the function of a product to
determine its status. In addition, the agencies' approach derives
from the broad remedial nature of their governing statutes and the
judicial mandate to rely upon the "economic realities" of a given
transaction in ascertaining jurisdiction. Viewed in this light, both
the SEC and CFTC believe themselves presumptively bound to
address products marketed and operating as investments, unless it
can be demonstrated that the instruments do not constitute securi-
ties or futures.
Although these and other conclusions may be drawn from SEC
and CFTC precedent and informal practice in the area of new
products, in many instances it remains the case that prospective
guidance that is sufficient to allow an institution to offer a particu-
lar instrument without first receiving some type of SEC or CFTC
clearance simply cannot be obtained. Furthermore, the question of
which of the two agencies has jurisdiction over a specific product is
very often itself unclear, and even those entities sincerely inter-
ested in obtaining any necessary regulatory clearances may be un-
sure of which agency to approach. In some cases, a firm may
receive SEC clearance only to discover that a CFTC problem that
has not been addressed still prevents marketing the product.
Moreover, the lack of prospective standards in this area cre-
ates serious problems not only for financial institutions, but also
for the regulators themselves. The former cannot be certain of
their ability to offer specific types of instruments without
preclearance; nevertheless, many entities simply may proceed to
market new instruments without such approval, as many have
done in numerous instances. In that event, the staffs of the SEC
and CFTC find themselves faced with a fait accompli because the
markets simply will be too large and too well organized to permit
regulatory intervention in the absence of a major battle between
334. See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. 20,254 (June 4, 1986). In addressing the applicability of the
Securities Act to certain annuity contracts, the SEC stated that one of the criteria relevant
to its determination was the manner in which the instruments would be primarily
marketed.
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industry and regulators. This conflict in fact has occurred in sev-
eral cases, most notably the CFTC's recent attempt to assert juris-
diction over the interbank currency market, as described above.
Accordingly, the SEC and the CFTC must develop some
objective standards that will allow the regulators as well as the reg-
ulated to implement longer term strategies with at least some as-
surance regarding the current state of the law. Toward this end, it
appears that the agencies should take a number of steps.
First, the SEC anld CFTC should enter into consultations to
construct a more coordinated approach to off-exchange instrument
regulation, along the lines of the Shad-Johnson Accord, delineating
the regulatory responsibilities of each agency in the off-exchange
area. The central element of this approach should be recognition
by each of the agencies that their respective spheres of jurisdiction
do not depend solely on the status of a derivative instrument, but
also on the nature of the underlying good or article.
Initially, the agencies should make clear that derivative instru-
ments on agricultural commodities or other nonsecurities goods
and services will be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC,
regardless of whether the derivatives themselves arguably consti-
tute securities. Although this approach would depart from prior
SEC statements, the SEC has not as a practical matter involved
itself in products based on traditional commodities, such as metals
or crops. This step, therefore, would formalize prior practice and
establish clear guidance about the locus of regulatory responsibil-
ity. In addition, through ongoing consultations with the CFTC, the
SEC could assure that such products would not be offered or sold
in a manner that would violate the federal securities laws.
The agencies then should state that the SEC will regulate pri-
marily derivative instruments on securities or indexes of securities,
unless such instruments constitute futures contracts based on the
criteria discussed below. In instances when concurrent jurisdiction
would exist, the agencies could establish a consultative mechanism
to insure that issuers will not require separate approvals from each
agency, which might impose conflicting obligations. The agencies
should not, however, provide the SEC with exclusive jurisdiction
over derivatives on securities because this would contravene the
CEA's explicit grant to the CFTC of exclusive jurisdiction over fu-
tures on all goods and articles.
Second, both the SEC and CFTC should issue guidelines gov-
erning trading in off-exchange instruments within their respective
spheres of authority. The SEC, for example, could state that prod-
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ucts within its jurisdiction will be fully subject to the Securities
Act, the ICA, and the other federal securities statutes, unless an
appropriate exemption is available. This policy would not require
any revision of the Howey test; it simply articulates the Howey
test's application to new financial instruments, along the lines of
the discussion above regarding derivatives on exempt securities.
Specifically, the SEC could state that the pooling of investors'
funds (horizontal commonality) will continue to raise the presump-
tion that a security has been created. When this pooling is absent,
however, a presumption could be raised that the instrument is not
a security, unless the instrument otherwise represents an invest-
ment in the issuer. Products involving direct interests in exempt
securities as well as derivatives based on physical commodities
would be excluded, and the SEC could focus on a more functional
definition.
For its part, the CFTC should undertake an "updating" of the
definition of a futures contract to reflect the types of off-exchange
instruments available today, recognizing that the distinctions
between forward contracts and futures contracts in existence in
1974 are no longer valid. Any such revision of the definition should
be based upon three considerations: (1) the presence of standard-
ized terms should not be dispositive, unless individually negoti-
ated, customized transactions are precluded and transactions can
be entered into by smaller traders without a commercial purpose;
(2) the margining of a transaction also should not be dispositive,
unless it is margined or collateralized solely on the value of the
underlying commodities and at levels low enough to be available to
small traders with no commercial purpose, and collateral deposited
on the basis of an individual credit analysis should not be treated
as a futures margin; and (3) the CFTC should not place undue em-
phasis on delivery, but rather should focus on whether delivery is
required, whether the parties have the financial and physical ca-
pacity to make and receive delivery, and, more generally, whether
the transaction occurs in the context of deliveries of physical com-
modities or is primarily a vehicle for hedging or speculation. This
would serve to bring the regulatory approach more into line with
market realities and would mitigate or eliminate many of the
problems recently encountered.
Finally, the agencies should identify categories of permissible
offerees with respect to new financial instruments in order to as-
sure public protection. In the case of the SEC, of course, the
existing Regulation D standard likely will be adequate in most
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instances. Nevertheless, as noted, with respect to products argua-
bly constituting "evidences of indebtedness," the SEC should seek
to delineate those "commercial purposes" that would remove the
instrument from the definition of a security.
The CFTC should also adopt an "accredited investor"
approach to regulation of permissible off-exchange instruments,
which would permit offers and sales thereof to be made to financial
institutions, commercial entities trading for hedging or other busi-
ness-related reasons, professional traders, and individuals meeting
minimum net worth, income, or transaction size specifications.
With respect to the second of these categories, the CFTC should
state clearly that hedgers, whether entities or individuals, are
among those authorized to enter into permissible off-exchange
instruments and should employ a definition broader than the
"bona fide hedge" definition in the Commission's regulations. Per-
sons entering into off-exchange transactions for legitimate business
reasons should be granted wider latitude as to the scope of permis-
sible activities, since speculation and abuse are less likely to occur
and the transactions may be more necessary to the effectuation of
a business purpose. The CFTC also should state that substantive
CEA regulation will not be imposed when adequate public protec-
tions, such as an effective SEC registration, are already in place.
The SEC and CFTC must begin to recognize and respond
appropriately to the dramatic changes that have occurred in the
markets within their jurisdiction over the past several years. The
most pressing need in the area of off-exchange instruments is an
acknowledgement that the over-the-counter "upstairs" market
among institutional investors is distinct in almost every respect
from the public "retail" market. The former market should be reg-
ulated in a separate manner. The agencies' goal in this area clearly
should be to allow the maximum flexibility possible to legitimate
business enterprises, consistent with public protection, and to
refrain from attempts at regulating markets in which no problems
have arisen. Only at that point can the agencies begin to adapt the
existing regulatory structures to current market realities and
needs.
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